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SUMMARY 
 
Liner shipping, which provides transportation by ships operating on a regular 
schedule between specified ports in accordance with publicly available timetables of 
sailing dates, is now a mature industry. The various players which are part of the liner 
shipping industry, namely, ocean carriers, port operators, freight forwarders or 
consolidators, customs, hinterland haulage carriers, inland navigation carriers, market 
regulators, etc., are increasingly interdependent on each other leading to inter-industry 
partnership. The recent global financial crisis has led to better vertical and horizontal 
cooperation among the ocean carriers and the nodal service providers in the liner 
shipping industry. However, some of the major liner carriers are yet to post profits as 
the freight rates were severely affected during the crisis.  
 
Amidst this evolving market environment, the liner shipping industry which used to 
be highly regulated through the conference system has witnessed the emergence of 
the contract paradigm of free bargaining norms where there is in place a service 
contract as promulgated under the Shipping Act of 1984 and the Ocean Shipping 
Reform Act of 1998 in the United States (US). The uniqueness of individual contracts 
between shippers and carriers has now been recognized in the US through these Acts 
for almost three decades. This uniqueness, it would appear, has influenced the 
development of the volume contract concept in the newly adopted convention called 
the Rotterdam Rules and has provided the impetus for introducing bargaining freedom 
in carriage of goods wholly or partly by sea.  
 
The thesis analyses the various economic and financial implications associated with 
the bargaining freedom under volume contracts through estimation and drawing the 
time-varying systematic risk, β in the liner shipping industry by using Kalman filters 
and relate the estimated path of β to market changes during 1980–2013, depending on 
availability of data. To interpret the market environment in the liner shipping 
industry, the focus is on two points. The first is that the introduction of policies for 
promoting competition increases β, and the second is that an increase in market power 
due to cooperation and concentration among firms reduces β. The result of the 
analysis is varied across jurisdictions showing a certain degree of dependence on the 
position of national or regional legislation in which the liner shipping company is 
operating. 
 
The thesis also attempts to view the volume contract concept from a particular 
vantage point, namely, the perspective of the shipper, who in the present world trade 
scenario is often a non-traditional entity such as a logistics service provider, freight 
forwarder or consolidator. Global players in the consolidation business like DHL and 
UPS along with a section of the liner shipping carriers, equipped with state of the art 
information technology, has opened up a new era of cooperation in the liner shipping 
business with capacity-based pricing, time-based pricing, and service-based pricing. It 
is submitted that the introduction of volume contracts will enable these consolidation 
companies to take advantage of the freedom of contract in expanding their business 
within the mature liner shipping industry thereby creating value for themselves as 
well as for small and medium shippers. It is notable in this context that consolidators 
licensed in the US were allowed service contract parity through the NVOCC Service 
Arrangements (NSA) rule in December 2004, when dealing with their shipper-
customers. However, there were certain tariff publication requirements which did not 
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allow consolidators to reap the full benefit of the NSA rule. In February 2010, the 
publication requirements were relaxed creating a new wave of opportunity for 
consolidators. The financial analysis therefore includes estimation and drawing the β 
in the consolidation business by using Kalman filters and relate the estimated path of 
β to market changes during the period 1988–2013, depending on availability of data, 
depicting the growing business opportunity for these nodal service providers who are 
an important part of the liner shipping industry. The commercial viability of volume 
contracts with regard to the liner shipping industry is presented in conclusion which 
also reflect the viewpoints of the authors. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The past thirty years witnessed phenomenal growth of containerisation and the liner 
shipping industry through out the world. Most of the growth was derived through 
expansion of liner shipping services in new regions of the world fuelled by 
development of production centres in the Far East and also enhancing the economies 
of scale by adopting the hub and spoke model. During this period, the introduction of 
new regulations led to changes in the market power of the liner shipping industry.  
Particularly, amendments introduced in the US Shipping Act, 1984 (1984 Act) and 
the subsequent promulgation of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA), 1998 which 
introduced and thereafter refined the so-called service contract mechanism initiated 
the deregulation process in the US allowing shipping lines to offer rates based on time 
and volume of cargo so that the freight-rates varied with cargo-volume tendered over 
a specified period. However, the effect of the 1984 Act was limited, because of the 
requirement in the statute that the terms and conditions of the contract had to be 
publicly available and could be demanded by other similarly situated shippers leading 
to “me-too” contracts. This problem was later rectified by the OSRA in 1998 which 
finally made freight-rates dependent on market reference points. While it is 
recognized that the service contract concept has benefited large shippers, there has 
been a strong complementary trend that has benefited smaller shippers through the 
growth of large consolidators such as UPS and DHL as well as others, on the 
international scene. The consolidators licensed in the US were also allowed service 
contract parity through the NVOCC Service Arrangements (NSA) rule in December 
2004, when dealing with their shipper-customers. However, there were certain tariff 
publication requirements which did not allow consolidators to reap the full benefit of 
the NSA rule until February 2010, when the publication requirements were relaxed. 
The new regulatory regime has created a new wave of opportunity for consolidators 
and will also benefit small and medium shippers.  
 
In carriage of goods by sea, the carrier-shipper relationship, apart from the 
apportionment of liability between the parties, there is another dimension which is the 
trade relationship. This component is equally important as the liability regime, if not 
more so, in terms of the wider picture of international trade is enmeshed with carriage 
of goods across continents. The pre-existing carriage of goods by sea regimes, namely 
the Hague/Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules do not deal with the trade aspects and 
only regulates the liability aspects. However, the newly adopted carriage of goods by 
sea convention called the Rotterdam Rules1 subsumed the US service contract concept 
through the so-called volume contracts thereby incorporating a trade dimension in a 
carriage regime. This incorporation attaches the potential to trigger further 
reorganisation in liner shipping throughout the globe. This thesis first introduces and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or 
Partly by Sea, also known as the Rotterdam Rules, was created by the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) through its Working Group III (Transport Law). The final text 
of the Convention is annexed to General Assembly Resolution 63/122, UN Doc A/RES/63/122. It was 
also annexed to the “Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
work of its forty-first session”, UN Doc A/63/17 (2008), Annex I. 
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demonstrates how the liner shipping companies might be affected through the 
introduction of volume contracts. It also examines how the freight forwarders or cargo 
consolidators, who are gaining increased importance in the liner shipping industry, 
interact with liner carriers and how their businesses might be benefitted through 
volume contracts. The thesis then discusses how market regulators might improve 
market efficiency through the introduction of the volume contract concept under the 
Rotterdam Rules. 
 
1.2. Object and purpose of the thesis 
 
The thesis first focuses on the time-varying systematic risk, β in the liner shipping 
industry. The thesis estimates and draws the time-varying systematic risk, β in the 
liner shipping industry by using Kalman filters and make an attempt to relate the 
estimated path of β to market changes during the period 1980 to 2013, depending on 
the availability of data. The thesis then tests the hypothesis that introduction of 
regulatory policies which foster competition in the shipping industry globally 
increases β and that an increase in market power engendered through cooperation and 
concentration among companies reduces β. The thesis then focuses on the estimation 
and drawing the β in the consolidation business by using Kalman filters and relate the 
estimated path of β to market changes during the period 1988–2013, depending on 
availability of data, depicting the growing business opportunity for these nodal 
service providers who are an important part of the liner shipping industry. It is 
submitted that CAPM-β being the most popular method to estimate cost of equity is 
an important input not only for the company’s management but also for the investors 
when they construct their portfolios. 
 
The thesis analyses the abundant financial literature which draws connection between 
β and market regulations affecting a firm’s risk. The thesis refers to earlier works 
which show β decreases if the market has protections, such as antitrust exemption and 
price regulation to stifle competition. The authors apply this to the liner shipping 
market to show that β should increase in response to the 1984 Act and the OSRA as 
the legislation promoted competition in liner shipping. A similar analysis is also made 
with consolidation firms to examine if β decreases after the passage of the NSA rule 
in 2004 and further relaxation of publication requirements in 2010. This provide the 
authors an opportunity to make a prognosis of the volume contract concept under the 
Rotterdam Rules to predict further changes in the liner shipping market. Perusing 
existing studies related to issues of market power and CAPM-β, the authors 
investigate whether that firms with higher monopoly power will lower β for both liner 
carriers and consolidators. In addition, the thesis examines whether market power and 
capital intensity are interactive causes of systematic risk β for carriers and 
consolidators.  
 
The thesis examines the service contract market, which being a futures market has 
different characteristics than the spot market. In a futures market the expectations on 
future freight rates increases or decreases are reflected in the actual rates. The carriage 
of large volumes may cause fierce competition, which may have a rate decreasing 
effect. It is envisaged by shipping industry experts that in the near future volume 
contracts will engender futures contracts to be drawn more frequently in liner 
shipping if the Rotterdam Rules enters into force. It is submitted that global players in 
the consolidation business like DHL and UPS along with a section of the liner 
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shipping carriers, equipped with state of the art information technology, has opened 
up a new era of cooperation in the liner shipping business with capacity-based 
pricing, time-based pricing, and service-based pricing. The introduction of volume 
contracts will enable carriers and consolidation companies to take advantage of the 
freedom of contract in expanding their business while operating in a mature industry.  
 
The specific research questions that are analysed and answered in the thesis are –  
 
(i) Whether volume contracts will increase the systematic risk of liner 
shipping companies? 
(ii) Whether volume contracts will benefit consolidation companies by 
reducing their systematic risk? 
 
1.3. Research methodology  
 
This research affords an opportunity to the authors to probe into a subject of 
contemporary interest in liner shipping from a financial perspective, and in particular 
will contribute to the growing importance of inter-disciplinary research involving law 
and finance. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the systematic risk of liner shipping and cargo 
consolidation companies. Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is used to measure 
the systematic risk of these companies, denoted by β. For estimation of the parameter 
β, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method is used. To capture the volatility 
clustering, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) 
model is used to calculate systematic risk and is then compared with the results 
obtained through the OLS method. As the main aim of the analysis is to look at the 
β’s sensitivity to changes in regulation and market power, the Kalman Filter 
algorithm is used to capture the time-varying β. To get 95% confidence intervals 
of time-varying β, Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) method is applied. In addition to 
that, Fama-French Three Factor (FF3F) model is used to confirm or contradict 
estimations. 
 
The past three decades has witnessed two important changes in the liner shipping 
market, namely, increased competition engendered through regulatory changes and 
increased market power through the formation of global alliances. To analyse the liner 
shipping market, the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach is useful.  This 
approach, which is a part of industrial organisation theory, is often applied in market 
analysis. Under the SCP framework, market performance is specified by market 
conduct, which in turn is specified by market structure. The market performance 
shows how successful is the industry in producing goods and services for the benefit 
of the consumer. Profit rate of the firms could be used as a parameter, as it reflects 
market performance. Market conduct exhibits the behaviour of the firms in the 
market, such as, their intern-firm cooperation or pricing strategy. The market structure 
includes the competitive environment in the market, which can be analysed using 
parameters such as the number of firms in the market, concentration ratio, etc. 
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Therefore, using the link between market performance, market conduct and market 
structure, a relationship between market performance and structure can be analysed.2 
 
In the liner shipping industry, the SCP approach has been applied to analyse the 
competitive market environment in prominent container routes.3 The relationship 
between freight capacity, freight rate and profit in world container markets has been 
examined using SCP approach. 4  One study has observed the changing market 
structure in liner shipping after the passage of the OSRA using the SCP approach as 
well.5  
 
Factors that may have effect on rate of return may be used as indices of market 
performance within the SCP framework. A firm’s risk structure is one of major 
factors to determine the rate of return. If the market and power and economic 
regulation changes the market structure, and it affects the rate of return, then it can be 
also stated that the risk is also affected by changes in competition and regulation. 
Therefore, a firm’s risk can be used in examining the effects of market change on that 
particular firm. Therefore, in this thesis CAPM-β is used to measure the systematic 
risk of the liner shipping and cargo consolidation companies. Similar methodology 
has been used in other sectors of the transportation industry as well. A detailed 
discussion on estimation models of CAPM-β is made in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
 
The thesis draws inspiration with respect to the methodological aspects for the 
financial analysis from a recently published article investigating the relationship 
between the CAPM- β and market changes in the Japanese liner shipping industry.6 
The literature survey made in that study led the authors of this thesis to some of the 
relevant publications which proved helpful in developing an understanding of the 
behaviour of β and its link to market changes.  This thesis then extends the scope of 
analysis by including the effect of shipping regulation on the cargo consolidation 
industry which is perhaps the first of its kind. It is also notable in this context that a 
part of the legal analysis on the effect of volume contracts on liner shipping and the 
consolidation industry is an extension of the work which one of the authors herein had 
performed during his doctoral research endeavour.  
 
The sources perused includes major textbooks and publications in the areas of law and 
finance, peer reviewed journal articles and materials available on-line. The data 
analysed for this thesis consist of monthly share prices of the leading liner shipping 
companies and consolidators across the world for the period 1980–2013 and 1988-
2013, respectively, depending on availability of data for specific companies. For the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Koichiro Tezuka, Masahiro Ishii and Motokazu Ishizaka, “Relationship between CAPM-β and market 
changes in the Japanese Liner Shipping Industry”, Maritime Policy & Management, May 2012, at p. 
298. 
3 J S L Lam, W Y Yap and K Cullinane, “Structure, conduct and performance on the major liner 
shipping routes”, Maritime Policy and Management, 34(4), 2007, at pp. 359–382. This study was 
particularly focused on the relationship between performance and structure. To measure the market 
structure, statistical dispersion measure, such as, the Gini ratio, concentration ratio, Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index (HHI) and the entropy coefficient were used. 4	  M Luo, L Fan, and L Liu, “An econometric analysis for container shipping market”, Maritime Policy 
and Management, 36(6), 2009, at pp. 507–524. 
5  M Fusillo, “Some notes on structure and stability in liner shipping”, Maritime Policy and 
Management, 33(5), 2006, at pp. 463–475. 
6 Tezuka, supra note 2. 
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purpose of comparison, the data for risk-free rate on government bonds of various 
markets are used along with the share price index from the Stock Exchanges where 
the respective shares are traded. Eviews and Microsoft Excel software are used to 
generate the statistical results for the thesis. The company description used in the 
Annexes is replicated from the information appearing in the DataStream database. In 
writing this thesis, footnotes are used instead of endnotes as a portion of the text 
refers to scholarly legal literature. To facilitate the use of referencing in the legal 
writing style, the use of footnotes has been the choice of the authors. A bibliography 
is attached at the end of the thesis which lists the books, journal articles, business and 
newspapers articles and other miscellaneous documents. 
 
1.4. Scheme of the thesis 
 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a brief description of the liner 
shipping industry followed by a discussion on the notion of service contracts as found 
in the US legislation. The chapter then goes on to trace the development of 
competition policy in liner shipping during the past two decades. It also explains how 
regulations and policies direct and control behaviours of the associated players who 
simultaneously account for interdependencies with others.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the main factors which affect the systematic risk and influence 
the level of competition in liner shipping and cargo consolidation market. The chapter 
then goes on to discuss the event study approach including some of its limitations 
followed by examination of financial models dealing with regulatory changes and 
changes in market power. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the sample data along with a brief discussion on observatory 
points for the purpose of the financial analysis.  
 
Chapter 5, which is the penultimate chapter presents the empirical results of the study 
and provide both financial and legal interpretations as reflected through the results. 
All the tables and graphs for liner shipping companies and intermediaries are 
compiled in Annexes I and II, respectively. Annex III presents the tables and graphs 
for the robustness check.  
 
Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary and conclusion to the thesis. Suggestions are 
made, both for financial decision makers and legislators, for the creation of a further 
competitive transportation industry which will facilitate the growth of international 
trade and also enhance the interests of the consumers of the society at large. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE VOLUME CONTRACT CONCEPT IN THE 
CONTEXT OF LINER SHIPPING 
 
2.1. Introduction to liner shipping 
 
Liner shipping is a transportation service following announced and scheduled ports of 
call. The origin of liner shipping can be traced back to the time of sailing ships. The 
end of the nineteenth century saw steam-powered ships replacing sailing ships in the 
liner trade. This transition was both technologically revolutionary and standard setting 
as steam power essentially improved the speed and reliability of ocean-going ships, 
and achieved universal adoption throughout the maritime industry. The consequence 
was over-tonnage which threatened liner operators’ large investments in ships and 
facilities. To prevent over-tonnage, the carriers began to cooperate among themselves 
leading to the creation of cartels called liner conferences. Legislation was 
promulgated in the early twentieth century in various parts of the world to provide 
antitrust protection to liner conferences in shipping.  
 
With the advent of containerisation in the mid-twentieth century, liner shipping 
received its second round of revolutionary technological innovation. Containerisation 
led to faster loading and unloading of cargo at ports with less turn-around time for 
ships. Larger and faster container ships led to the hub and spoke maritime 
transportation model supported by specialised container terminals established in 
major ports. These terminals transferred cargo from large deep-sea container vessels 
to smaller feeder vessels allowing liner shipping companies to extract value from the 
resulting economies of scale. 
 
The modern-day liner shipping companies operate in a highly internationalised 
market catering to a globalised marketplace where production centres are widely 
dispersed which underline the need for fully connected and highly integrated 
distribution systems. In many markets, timely delivery of goods is as critical as 
offering a competitive freight rate by liner carriers. The liner shipping industry has 
witnessed continuing restructuring with large, powerful firms enjoying extensive 
market concentration. These companies also created extensive shipping networks of 
considerable complexity and specialisation offering increased access to the core 
markets and to niche markets within them. This led to increased economies of scale 
and of network density which resulted in larger ships, higher port productivities and 
the necessity for tighter information control and e-business systems integration. The 
past two decades also evidenced restructured landside logistics and supply chains 
modifying and altering network shape.  
 
The various nodal service providers who cater to liner carriers, namely, port 
operators, consolidation or distribution centres, hinterland service operators such as 
truck haulage, railway operators, and third party logistics providers contribute to 
comprehensive service networks. The liner carriers and the nodal service providers 
select each other in order to obtain better performance in tandem than it could be 
achieved in isolation. On one hand, the maritime carriers select efficient nodal service 
providers so that the waiting time and total voyage time could be shortened as well as 
to avoid potential risks. Sometimes, the carriers even propose and invest in new 
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landward infrastructure when it is worthwhile to do so. On the other hand, nodal 
service providers select large carriers so that the capacity of the former can be better 
utilized and higher profits can be achieved.  
 
The diagram below depicts the shift in focus from unimodal carriage solutions in 
international trade transactions to a multimodal carriage situation where the emphasis 
is more on door-to-door transport. Modern businesses in seeking transport solutions 
not only want transporters to carry cargo from point A to B following a published 
schedule by offering competitive freight rates, ensuring timely sailing and availability 
of vessel space but also demands solutions based on supply chain management 
techniques. A brief discussion on supply chain management aspects is made in the 
next chapter. 
  
 
The remainder of this chapter explains the notion of service contracts as found in the 
US legislation and goes on to trace the development of competition policy in liner 
shipping during the past two decades. The chapter then explains how regulations and 
policies direct and control behaviours of the associated players who simultaneously 
account for interdependencies with others.  
 
2.2. The United States concept of service contracts 
 
Before delving into the intricacies of the relationship between shipper and carrier 
entering into a volume contract under the Rotterdam Rules, it would be of interest to 
trace the origins of service contracts in the US. This discussion will provide an 
understanding of the vital need to include volume contracts in the Rotterdam Rules. A 
“service contract” in the US is defined under section 3(19) of the 1984 Acts as:  
a written contract, other than a bill of lading or a receipt, between one or 
more shippers and an individual ocean common carrier or an agreement 
between or among ocean common carriers in which the shipper or 
shippers makes a commitment to provide a certain volume or portion of 
cargo over a fixed time period, and the ocean common carrier or the 
agreement commits to a certain rate or rate schedule and a defined service 
level, such as assured space, transit time, port rotation, or similar service 
features. The contract may also specify provisions in the event of non-
performance on the part of any party.  
 
The differential treatment of apparently similarly situated shippers was not allowed in 
the US for nearly a century. Equal treatment of all shippers, strictly based on 
published prices and terms of service, was in popular belief considered essential for a 
fair shipping market.7 However, the economic wisdom of deregulation of the seaborne 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See Marc Levinson, “Two Cheers for Discrimination: Deregulation and Efficiency in the Reform of 
U.S. Freight Transportation, 1976–1998” published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the 
Business History Conference (2008), at p.178. 
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cargo regime in the US between 1984 and 1998 was borne out by the superior 
performance of the ocean liner market under normal price competition, contrary to 
long-standing claims from the shipping industry and various academics.8  Some 
scholars have concluded that the most important result of freight deregulation was the 
end of the ban on discrimination which has substantial aggregate benefits for shippers 
and the economy.9 However, little has been said in the US in published literature or 
court decisions on the distributional consequences of service contracts among 
shippers and the communities in which they are located. The incorporation of volume 
contracts in the Rotterdam Rules has brought this issue into the forefront 
internationally. The distributional consequences are difficult to measure even though 
information on average ocean shipping rates for containers on certain trade routes is 
available, because there is no information available in the public domain on rates paid 
by individual shippers or the service terms associated with the published prices.  
 
Prior to 1984, all ocean freight to or from the United States moved under published 
tariffs and most international shipping lines belonged to liner conferences. These 
conferences are cartels whose memberships comprise seagoing common carriers 
engaged in providing sea transport services under a common tariff, deriving their 
legitimacy largely from statutory enactments supporting their contractual 
arrangements.10 The genesis of the conference system dates back to 1875. The first 
liner conferences covered trade in routes between Britain and India at the behest of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Prior to the deregulation process in the US, a body of theoretical work grew to support claims from 
ocean carriers, bolstering the argument that they required antitrust immunity. See Stephen Craig 
Pirrong, “An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets”, 35 J.L. & Econ. 
89 (1992); William Sjostrom, “Antitrust Immunity for Shipping Conferences: An Empty Core 
Approach”, Antitrust Bull., Summer 1993, at p. 419. 
9 For example, Elizabeth E. Bailey, ‘Price and Productivity Change Following Deregulation: The US 
Experience’ The Economic Journal, Vol. 96, No. 381 (1986), at p. 15, asserts that “the ‘losers’ from 
deregulation have been far fewer than might have been imagined… the ‘gainers’ have included 
business users most of all as cross-subsidy has ended …” A criticism against Bailey is that she ignores 
the possibility that businesses could lose from deregulation if their relative freight costs rose as 
compared to other domestic companies or to competing importers, even if their freight costs fell in 
absolute terms. Paul W. MacAvoy, Industry regulation and the performance of the American economy 
New York: W.W. Norton, (1992), focuses entirely on the efficiency gains from a macro perspective. 
From a road transport perspective some authors find that freight transport deregulation brought large 
economic gains to shippers but add that “the distributional effects that probably exist between small 
and large shippers make it very unlikely that all shippers have shared in the benefits;” on the 
distributional point, however, they present no evidence; see Clifford Winston, Thomas M. Corsi, Curtis 
M. Grimm, Carol A. Evans, The Economic Effects of Surface Freight Deregulation, Brookings 
Institution Press (1990), at p. 41. Mark H. Rose, Bruce E. Seely, and Paul F. Barrett, The Best  
Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and  American Public Policy in the 
Twentieth Century, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, (2006) at pp. 212–239, ignore 
discrimination in the wake of deregulation altogether. Richard Vietor, Contrived Competition: 
Regulation and Deregulation in America, Belknap Press (1996) at p. 320, emphasizes that deregulation 
destroyed existing market segmentation and forced companies to devise new strategies for segmenting 
markets, although he does not discuss freight specifically. Laurence T. Phillips, ‘Contractual 
Relationships in the Deregulated Transportation Marketplace’ 34 Journal of Law and Economics, 
(1992), at pp. 535-564, undertakes a many-faceted examination of the role of contracts in freight 
transportation, albeit with only minimal evidence on contracts between carriers and shippers. Marc 
Levinson, supra note 7, at p. 179 asserts that studies of the cost impact of maritime deregulation are 
almost totally lacking, due to unavailability of accurate public information about freight costs.  
10 The Shipping Act of 1984 of the United States, 46 U.S.C. app. § 1702 (7) (2001) defines conference 
as “an association of ocean common carriers permitted, pursuant to an approved or effective 
agreement, to engage in concerted activity and utilize a common tariff; but the term does not include a 
joint service, consortium, pooling, sailing, or transhipment arrangement.” 
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leading British carrier companies.11 Carriers in the United States followed the British 
example around the turn of the century. Liner shipping progressed under the 
conference system and remained largely unchanged until the mid-twentieth century 
when containerization became predominant. 
 
In the United States a shipping line could choose to join a liner conference or operate 
outside it if it so wished but the conferences were under compulsion to make 
themselves available to all shipping lines. The rate structure for goods comprised 
three levels of possibilities, the first being the standard rate. If a shipper signed a 
loyalty contract with the carrier, it could gain a benefit of some 15 percent.12 Under 
this second level arrangement, the shipper would have to commit the whole of the 
cargo to the conference or a fixed portion thereof. This arrangement could be risky for 
the shipper if the first available conference ship happened to be fully booked resulting 
in a waiting period for the next conference ship with sufficient available space. The 
third option, the most economical one, would be for the shipper to go with an 
independent carrier who was not a member of a conference and pay the published 
rate, provided the carrier was able to handle the business. The risk involved in this 
option was the possibility of the independent carrier’s under-capacity compelling the 
shipper to ship some of its cargo with a conference carrier. In that case the shipper 
would have to pay the standard tariff and its overall cost would be considerably 
higher than the cost it would have incurred under a loyalty contract. 
 
All the above-noted arrangements required the publication of tariffs for all 
commodities which had to be filed with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC). As 
such, the tariffs were publicly available to all prospective shippers and no special 
treatment by the carrier was allowed in the form of a volume discount or provision of 
some other preferential service. 
 
Then the 1984 Shipping Act was enacted which was a pioneering piece of legislation 
heralded as the start of the deregulation process in the United States. Shipping lines 
were permitted to offer rates based on time and volume of cargo so that the rates 
varied with cargo volume tendered over a specified period. Obviously, it was the large 
shippers who benefitted from this liberalization and unsurprisingly, those who 
opposed it were the same ones who were against any discrimination benefitting large 
shippers. These were the traditional supporters of regulation in the field of seaborne 
trade.  
 
Furthermore, under the Act, shipping lines and liner conferences were allowed to 
enter into arrangements known as service contracts with shippers under which the 
shipper would agree to provide a designated volume of cargo over a specified period 
of time. By so doing, it was envisaged that the shipper would secure preferential 
freight rates as well as a host of other positive returns such as shipboard guarantee of 
space, orderly sailings and overall reliability of service. Often these contracts would 
provide coverage of service extending to shore side transportation; in other words, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The Calcutta Conference was the first and was created at the urging of the steamship leader Sir 
Samuel Cunard. There is evidence of prototypical conferences existing as early as the 1850s, though 
they were not modern in the sense that they seem never to have agreed on prices or output. See Chris 
Sagers, ‘The Demise of Regulation in Ocean Shipping: A Study in the Evolution of Competition Policy 
and the Predictive Power of Microeconomics’ 39 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 779, footnote 37. 
12 See Levinson supra note 7, at p. 201. 
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entire logistical chain could be rendered undivided in so far as billing was concerned. 
Liquidated damages provisions in the contract were permissible under the legislation 
for failure of performance of obligations.       
 
The 1984 Act also permitted a departure from the published conference rates through 
“independent action”. Tariffs published under independent action averaged 11-25 
percent below standard conference tariffs with respect to a specified commodity.13 
These independently generated rates could force conference carriers to bring down 
their own published rates in order to compete. Thus the Act engendered a system 
whereby shippers could freely negotiate rates to their advantage but the necessary 
terms of a contract had to be made public without discrimination. The hallmarks of 
common carriage were thus preserved in conjunction with a considerable degree of 
deregulation of economic transactions between carriers and shippers such as 
discrimination in relation to volume of cargo. Although the Shipping Act of 1984 
permitted service contracts, the effect of that permission was very limited, because of 
the requirement in the statute that the terms and conditions of the contract had to be 
publicly available and could be demanded by other similarly-situated shippers. But, it 
was often not clear what attributes constituted a “similarly-situated” shipper. Of 
course, the market forces reacted; when a shipping line offered a rate reduction from 
the conference rate, several small volume shippers wanted to jump on the bandwagon 
with the so-called “me too” contracts causing carriers to recoil so that only large 
volume shippers who quickly moved in on the action succeeded. Thus, the 1984 
Shipping Act by legitimizing rate discrimination was viewed as favouring large 
shippers against the interests of their smaller counterparts. It would appear that 
technically the service contract concept endorsed and supported by legislation largely 
benefitted the major shippers who had considerably more bargaining clout. However, 
the conditions under which such discrimination took place was conceivably narrow 
which made the possibility of such discrimination not widely practical. In fact, it is 
argued that the “me too” provision in the statute really re-established with the left 
hand the anti-rate discrimination policy which the service contract provision in the 
Shipping Act tried to give with the right hand. 
 
Finally, the OSRA enacted in 1998 allowed confidentiality of rates in service 
contracts and abolished the requirement for carriers to cater to small shippers who 
wanted similar rates. The new Act by removing the “me-too” requirement and 
providing for confidentiality fulfilled the formal promise that was in the Shipping Act 
of 1984 but which was never actualized by the restrictions in that Act. As a result, 
service contracts came into more frequent use and virtually became the norm through 
which rates were set. 14 These contracts could cover even a unit as low as a single 
container.15 Removal of all of the regulatory strictures made possible by this Act 
including the legitimization of confidentiality and elimination of the compulsion to 
offer similar terms to similar shippers became most advantageous for the mega 
shippers who had negotiating power far in excess of small shippers. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 U.S. Federal Maritime Commission, “Section 18 Report on the Shipping Act of 1984,” September 
1989 at p. 130. 
14 U.S. Federal Maritime Commission, “The Impact of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998,” 
September 2001, at p. 84. 
15 Ibid., at pp. 21–22. 
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The reduction in barriers to world trade and the emergence of international production 
centres in Asia impacted the flow of global trade and strategic approaches to 
international maritime transport. The reforms in 1998 enabled globalized 
manufacturers and retailers to gain advantageous contractual arrangements which 
were based on market reference points. While the cost to the shipping line was the 
base for these arrangements, they were essentially according to market reference 
points. In other words, the price set was the cost to the manufacturer as the floor, but 
the actual price established was often well above this level; as high as the market 
would bear. This shift in philosophy was largely seen as benefitting the major players 
among the shippers simply because they were the ones who could on a temporal basis 
supply large volumes of commodities. This in turn enabled carriers to benefit from 
lower costs.16 A relevant question in this regard was whether the arrangements 
engendered by the service contract concept strongly endorsed by legislation 
exemplified a balance of bargaining power between carriers and shippers or whether 
it manifested itself as an enhancement of the commercial powers of large shippers. 
Information itself became a valuable commodity for both parties concerned since 
rates were no longer required to be published and confidentiality became the rule of 
the day. Again it was the larger shippers who were better equipped to access 
information pertaining to the market better than their smaller counterparts. The 
information in turn became a formidable bargaining tool.  
 
While it is recognized that the service contract concept has benefited large shippers, 
there has been a strong complementary trend that has benefited smaller shippers 
through the growth of large consolidators such as UPS and DHL as well as others, on 
the international scene.  Some of these consolidators have evolved from small entities 
operating out of a basement or small office to large and sophisticated shipping, 
logistics management and supply chain management service providers with 
operations and offices all across the globe.  There is considerable competition among 
these consolidators which have given them every incentive to negotiate major 
discounts with asset-based ocean carriers and to pass a good portion of those savings 
on to their own customers.  These have enabled many smaller shippers to get at least 
part of the benefit of the volume discounts experienced by large shippers.   Moreover, 
as indicated earlier these large consolidators often offer supply-chain management 
services as well, to the benefit of smaller shippers.17  
 
The service contract arrangement based on time-volume supply of goods enabled 
shippers to make substantial savings on their inventories which in some instances 
were higher than their savings on freight. This major advantage in the context of 
service contracts can easily be transposed into the volume contract regime introduced 
through the Rotterdam Rules. Similar advantages can be gained through a typical 
volume contract arrangement not only in terms of savings as indicated above, but also 
provide carriers the opportunity to integrate their operations into the land based 
logistics side of the global supply chain. Viewed in this light, the management of 
logistical arrangements can and is gradually becoming an industry in its own right. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See Hayden G. Stewart, and Fred S. Inaba, “Ocean Liner Shipping: Organizational and Contractual 
Response by Agribusiness Shippers to Regulatory Change.” Agribusiness 19 (2003) at p. 462. Data on 
contracts signed by shipper associations are from American Shipper, Feb. 1992, at p. 42. 
17 See Proshanto K. Mukherjee & Abhinayan Basu Bal, “A Legal and Economic Analysis of the 
Volume Contract Concept under the Rotterdam Rules: Selected Issues in Perspective”, Journal of 
Maritime Law & Commerce, Volume 40, Issue No. 4, (October 2009), at p. 589. 
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Such management would include a variety of logistical activities including shore side 
transportation, warehousing and reduction of inventory costs. It is stated that 
advantages such as this would not have been possible without arrangements typical of 
the volume contract as they can provide commodity owners protection against the 
risks of stocking and restocking their inventories without the disadvantage of 
irregularity of shipments.  
 
2.3. Development of competition policy and legislation in liner shipping 
 
Countries that consider themselves essentially free-trading have long had defensive 
legislation designed to protect their national trade and shipping interests from harm 
caused by other countries’ protectionist measures. For example, the US instituted a 
regulatory scheme similar to the British conference system, which handled oversight 
of the international ocean shipping industry. This design was initially embodied in the 
Shipping Act of 1916.18 Throughout most of the 20th century, the US continued to 
regulate the liner industry – first by imposing new and additional standards on the 
trade, then by introducing partial deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps the 
most significant changes in the regulation of shipping companies operating in the US 
foreign commerce came with passage of the Shipping Act of 1984 and the subsequent 
OSRA 1998, the latter introducing new deregulatory amendments to the 1984 act and 
‘further signalling a significant paradigm shift in shipping regulation.’19 The most 
enduring change brought about by OSRA is a reorientation of the regulatory scheme 
from common carriage20  to a predominantly contract-based system. At present, 
regulation of the international liner industry is continued in the US and entrusted to a 
quasi-independent regulatory agency known as the Federal Maritime Commission 
(FMC) which has recently been taking on a more interventionist role21. 
 
It is to be noted here that the fundamental controversy underlying any regulation is 
the on-going need to work out the inevitable trade-off between the good of the whole 
society, on the one hand, and the rights of the individual, on the other. In the words of 
a notable commentator22, 
In any regulation, these trade-offs have appeared most clearly as ways of 
relieving the persistent tension between the forces seeking to implement 
economic efficiency for the broad benefit of society, and those dedicated 
to guaranteeing the observance of legal due process for every individual 
member of that society. At different times in history, each party to these 
fundamental tensions has established a clear advantage over the other. On 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 46 App. U.S.C. § 801 et seq. 
19 See Federal Maritime Commission 42nd Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2003 March 31, 2004, 
available online at http://www.fmc.gov/UserFiles/pages/File/Annual_Report_FY_2003.pdf 
20 The common carriage approach is generally considered a public service or at times, a public utility. It 
is often highly regulated, with routes and tariffs, or charges, with liability limits for loss or damage to 
cargo often fixed by statute. The license to perform common carriage services is often considered 
something of a concession given by the government for public convenience and necessity. Anyone can 
ostensibly have his or her goods carried by a common carrier without discrimination. Common carriage 
requires all liner carriers to establish and make public their tariffs and any changes, before they take 
effect.  
21 The FMC is responsible for overseeing and enforcing the Shipping Act of 1984, as amended, and the 
law’s implementing regulations. Shippers, ocean common carriers, intermediaries (NVOCCs and ocean 
freight forwarders), shippers’ associations, marine terminal operators, and others are subject to the 
Shipping Act and the FMC’s regulatory purview. 
22 Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation: Charles Francis Adams; Louis D. Brandeis; James M. 
Landis; Alfred E. Kahn, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984, at p. 301. 
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balance, however, it seems clear that the concern about legal process has 
controlled the outcome of regulation more often than has the concern 
about the substance of economic efficiency. In economists’ language, this 
means that the concern for equity has generally triumphed over the quest 
for efficiency. In lawyers’ terms, it means that in regulation the judicial 
model has usually triumphed over the legislative and administrative 
model. In cultural terms, it means that the concern for fairness and for the 
protection of the diverse interests of all affected individuals has most 
often won out over the concern for overall growth in the national 
economy. More generally in political terms, it means that regulation is 
best understood as a political settlement, undertaken in an effort to keep 
peace within the polity. Overall, the conclusion appears inescapable that 
regulation in a country has more often functioned as a protective device 
rather than as a promotional or developmental one. Of course, protection 
was not always inappropriate. By holding in check socially destructive 
forms of behaviour, protective regulation often cushioned the impact of 
rapid industrial change.  
 
The US maintained a higher level of regulatory oversight of the international liner 
shipping industry based on British law. Relative to the US, most countries in other 
continents practised a laissez faire approach to regulating their ocean carriers and 
shippers. The regulatory regimes in the US and Europe varied in their approaches to 
jurisdiction and the enforcement of regulations governing conduct of shippers, 
carriers, and intermediaries involved in ocean shipping. In part, these contrasting 
regulatory perspectives had led to sometimes significantly different economic 
consequences.23 It is also notable that while in the US, private parties, such as 
shippers, carriers, freight forwarders and shippers’ associations looked towards FMC 
action, in Europe, the actors relied on resolutions under private law. 
 
The European Commission’s Regulation 4056/86 which had granted liner carriers a 
block exemption from Europe’s competition laws allowing shipping conferences to 
continue on trade routes to and from Europe was repealed through EC Regulation 
1419/2006 in September 2006, which came into effect on October 2008. The repeal of 
the antitrust exemption prohibits carriers from engaging in collective rate setting and 
discussing capacity utilization in detail, but carriers are allowed to continue vessel-
sharing agreements and other “efficiency-enhancing” operational agreements.24  
 
Asian shippers have been pushing for repeal of antitrust immunity among Asian 
nations but with mixed success. The Asian countries have different dominant roles in 
liner services, which partly explains the respective position of these countries with 
respect to liner conferences. China and India are net users of liner services, Japan is a 
net provider of liner services, and Hong Kong and Singapore are primarily facilitators 
of liner services. The focal point over rate-setting practices in Asia has been the 
assessment of terminal handling charges that were instituted by the liner carriers 
starting in 2001. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Richard K Bank, Ashley W Craig and Edward J Sheppard IV, “Shifting Seas: A Survey of US 
and European Liner Shipping Regulatory Developments Affecting the Trans-Atlantic Trades”, 
Maritime Economics & Logistics, (2005) 7, (56–72), at p. 59. 
24 “Antitrust: Commission Adopts Guidelines on Application of Competition Rules to Maritime 
Transport Services,” IP/08/1063, Brussels, 1 July 2008 available online at  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/ 
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China is one of the emerging players in liner shipping and it passed a competition law 
in August 2007 that came into force in August 2008. The new law does not exempt 
liner conferences from the law’s antitrust provisions.25 China’s policy in this area 
appears to be in a state of flux, but it is not clear as of yet what the exact implications 
will be for liner carriers calling at Chinese ports.  
 
India is purportedly moving in the direction of outlawing collective rate setting. The 
Competition Commission of India, created by a law passed in 2002 appears to be in 
favour of banning collective-rate setting and has advised India’s Ministry of Shipping 
to curb the practice. However, India’s Ministry of Shipping appears to favour further 
oversight of current shipping practices rather than an outright ban on conferences.26  
 
Japan appears to favour the status quo allowing the conference system to continue. 
The position is governed by the Marine Transportation Law 1949 (as subsequently 
amended), which sets out an overall framework for the regulation and promotion of 
shipping, including the competition aspects.  It adopts a common carriage approach, 
requiring all liner carriers to establish and make public their tariffs and any changes 
before they take effect. Agreements between two or more carriers relating to freight 
rates and other conditions of transport, routes, sailings, etc, are exempted from the Act 
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopolisation and Maintenance of Fair Trade 
1947 unless unfair trade practices are employed or user interests are unduly impaired 
by the effective restriction of competition in trade.  A “report” of any such agreement 
must be filed in advance with the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.  
Japan may prove to be a holdout for the conference system due to the fact that large 
shippers are linked to large ocean carriers in Japan through the keiretsu or “group 
system” of business organization.27 Also, Japan may favour the carrier’s perspective 
because Japanese ocean carriers rely more on trade outside Japan than they do on 
trade to or from Japan. Japan does not wish to forego the maritime exemption as 
liners pump substantial monies into its national economy.28 Therefore, Japan will 
probably be the last state internationally to move towards a more market-based 
system.  
 
Singapore and Hong Kong, like Japan, are also home to major ocean carriers and are 
world rivals as container transfer hubs, but neither is home to large producers or 
importers of liner cargo. Understandably, a concern of the Hong Kong and Singapore 
governments is that they not be too far out of step with the maritime regulatory 
regimes of the major trading nations using their transport services. Hong Kong’s 
strong tradition for laissez faire policies may explain its lack of competition 
legislation, but it appears to be evaluating the need for a competition policy in the 
liner sector. Hong Kong has lost some of its market share to mainland Chinese ports, 
partly because of higher terminal handling charges that are applied across the board 
by the shipping lines calling at Hong Kong. Singapore granted a five year exemption 
for liner carriers from its new Competition Act passed in 2004, which took effect 
from January 2006 and a block exemption for an initial unspecified period for 
conference and discussion agreements, but subject to review in the light of local and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “China’s Anti-trust Act to Outlaw Liner Conferences”, Lloyd’s List, 18 September 2007, p. 1. 
26 “Asia’s Antitrust Revolution,” American Shipper, November 2007, pp. 10-12. 
27 “Internal Struggle,” American Shipper, June 2007, pp. 50-55. 
28 “Asia Confident of Liner-block Move; Region Expected to Follow in Footsteps of European 
Repeal,” Lloyd’s List, 20 September 2007, p. 7. 
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international maritime industry developments. Detailed provisions were subsequently 
worked out and the Competition (Block Exemption for Liner Shipping Agreements) 
Order 2006 was given retrospective effect from January of that year.  The Singapore 
Competition Commission stated “it was seeking to create a regulatory environment 
for shipping lines operating through Singapore that was broadly aligned with that in 
other major jurisdictions.”29 
 
2.4. Deregulation and the evolving role of intermediaries in liner shipping 
 
The non-vessel-operating common carriers (NVOCCs) in the United States seemingly 
play an important role in passing the benefits of the new contract-based regulatory 
approach in the United States. Taking the cue from the service contract experience in 
the United States, it has been recognized that the volume contract concept will benefit 
large shippers. But there has been a strong complementary trend that has benefited 
smaller shippers through the growth of large consolidators such as UPS and DHL as 
well as others, on the international scene.  
 
The benefits of consolidators to smaller shippers depend on the existence of vigorous 
competition among them; otherwise, the consolidators will keep the benefits of their 
consolidation to themselves.  In some markets vigorous competition is evident. The 
existence of that competition depends on there being a substantial number of 
competitors in the market, none with market power.  
 
The global forwarding market is highly fragmented with the top 10 consolidators 
accounting for 42 per cent of the market. The market leader, DHL, controls around 9 
per cent of the business. The following pie chart depicts the market share of 
consolidators in 2008. 
 
	  
	  
The analysis of market shares/market power is revealing and useful, since it shows 
that no one or a small group of these companies has a commanding market share.  
 
In Europe, a forwarder may perform traditional duties and activities, such as 
preparing the ocean bill of lading for the vessel carrier, directing cargo to carriers, 
and/or assisting a shipper with the export transaction; or assume common carrier 
status by issuing its own house bill of lading, and/or assuming responsibility for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 “Singapore Antitrust Immunity Stays for Liner Groupings,” The Business Times Singapore, 5 
October 2006. 
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transportation of cargo from origin to destination. The European Union does not 
regulate the conduct and business of transportation intermediaries as in the United 
States. The term ‘NVOCC’ is a unique legal entity created by American law and 
regulation.30 European intermediaries are simply referred to as ‘forwarders,’ and, as a 
general statement, do not have to comply with the European Union regulatory 
requirements similar to those of the United States and enforced by the FMC. While, 
there is no requirement in the European Union for forwarders to obtain a license from 
Brussels or from a national government or to satisfy certain financial responsibility 
requirements, there may be certain applicable business licensing requirements 
promulgated by national, regional, or city governments in the European Union. 
However, in the United States, it is relatively easy for someone entering the 
intermediary market to obtain a license, and the financial responsibility requirements 
are not very onerous.  Thus, those requirements do not pose any real barrier to entry 
or appreciably increase the cost of operation.   
 
Under the United States regulatory scheme, both NVOCCs and forwarders, which are 
defined as ‘Ocean Transportation Intermediaries’ under OSRA, are subject to certain 
licensing and financial responsibility requirements. NVOCCs are prohibited from 
offering ‘service contract’ rates to shippers. The FMC in the alternative decided to 
authorize ‘service arrangements’ for NVOCCs and shippers in October 2004 to 
provide a sense of parity with service contracts.31  Eight petitions were filed with the 
FMC in 2003 to 2004, on the subject of NVOCC Service Contracts by third-Party 
Logistics Providers such as UPS, FedEx, BAX Global, and DHL-Danzas, each calling 
for service contract authority or reform of tariff publication requirements.32  In 
response to these petitions, the FMC authorized ‘NVOCC Service Arrangements’ 
(NSA). The so-called NSA rule provided ‘service contract parity’ to NVOCCs acting 
as carriers, when dealing with their shipper-customers. This was allowed under 
Section 16 of the Shipping Act, exempting NVOCCs from the tariff publication, 
adherence, and enforcement requirements of the Shipping Act, subject to certain filing 
and publication requirements placed on NSAs.33 In contrast to the service contract 
rules34, it is important to note that the NSA rule prohibits shippers’ associations that 
include NVOCCs as members from entering into an NSA.35 This restriction is 
comparable to the prohibition in the NSA Rule on NVOCC-to-NVOCC NSAs, where 
one NVOCC acts as carrier and the other as shipper. In each instance, the FMC 
determined that permitting such behaviour might eventually lead to anti-competitive 
activities on the part of the NVOCCs without any effective regulatory oversight by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The Shipping Act defines NVOCC as ‘a common carrier that does not operate the vessels by which 
the ocean transportation is provided, and is a shipper in its relationship with an ocean common carrier.’ 
See 46 U.S.C. app. 1702(17)(B); see also 46 C.F.R. 515.2(o)(2). 
31 For a detailed discussion see Bank, et al., supra, note 23 at p. 61. 
32 With the passage of the OSRA in 1998 service contract became extremely popular and the FMC 
recognized that ‘service contracts have become the overwhelmingly predominant rate-setting vehicle.’ 
See FMC 42nd Annual Report, supra note 19 at p. 7. 
33 See 69 Federal Regulation 75,850 (20 December 2004). 
34 46 C.F.R. 530 et seq. 
35 Under the NSA Rule, an ‘NSA shipper’ is defined as ‘a cargo owner, the person for whose account 
the ocean transportation is provided, the person to whom delivery is to be made, or a shippers’ 
association y [t]he term does not include NVOCCs or shippers’ associations whose membership 
includes NVOCCs.’ See 46 C.F.R. 531.3(o). 
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either the FMC or other United States federal agencies, for example, the Department 
of Justice.36  
 
The NVOCCs stressed that contracting authority was a major issue to the evolving 
international shipping community and thus called upon the FMC to further the 
deregulatory spirit of OSRA by extending confidential contracting authority to 
intermediaries. The NVOCCs also emphasized that contract authority was necessary 
to meet the demands of their shipper-clients, the continuing integration of logistics 
services across all modes, and responsive to the age-old demand for confidential 
ocean rates. The NSA rule represents one of those rare occasions when the regulated 
and the regulator understood the significance of an issue and came together to address 
it effectively. 37 The FMC has commented that ‘[t]he [NSA] rulemaking will provide 
shippers with a broader range of service options, and greater opportunities for 
integrated supply chain solutions... [A]s the use of NSAs develops over time they will 
ultimately lead to greater competition and a more efficient shipping industry.’38 Some 
shippers’ associations have pointed out the NSA rule’s prohibition on NVOCC-to-
NVOCC arrangements is unnecessary and counter productive.39 
 
Until recently, NVOCCs had to additionally publish and maintain a tariff. The critics 
of the NSA rule were long emphasising that the real issue involved tariff publication 
and enforcement. 40  In a decision of the FMC issued in February 2010, the 
Commission ruled that NVOCCs would not have to publish tariffs. The 3-1 decision 
largely approved a petition submitted by the National Customs Brokers and 
Forwarders Association, Inc. (NBBFAA) that sought an exemption from the 
Commission under the Shipping Act of 1984 as amended that would exempt rate 
tariffs from being published.41 This is a major development with respect to NVOCCs, 
as it will appreciably make it easier for them to operate and respond to market 
conditions.  It makes it even more likely that such companies will be able to serve 
their function of providing the benefits of competition to smaller shippers. 
 
In its decision the Commission permitted licensed NVOCCs to be exempt from the 
requirement and associated costs of publishing rates under the Shipping Act. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 See generally Federal Maritime Commission Docket No. 04–12, “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
NVOCC Service Arrangements” (28 October 2004), 46 CFR Part 531, for a full discussion of the 
FMC’s rationale for imposing the restrictions, available online at http://www.fmc.gov/Dockets/04-
12%20Proposed%20Rule.htm 
37 See Bank, et al., supra note 23 at p. 66-67. 
38 See remarks of Steven R. Blust, Chairman of the Federal Maritime Commission, “Federal Maritime 
Commission News Release”, 15 December 2004, available online at 
http://www.fmc.gov/speeches/newsrelease.asp?SPEECH_ID=184. 
39  On 8 February 2005, the FMC denied Petitions for Reconsideration and Stay filed by the 
International Shippers’ Association and the American Institute for Shippers’ Associations. See Docket 
No. 04-12, available online at 
http://www.fmc.gov/file.asp?F=4E65356D9726433C8B35736720C6098C.htm&N=04-
12+reconsideration+order+2-8-05.htm&C=docket_activity. Additionally, on that day the FMC 
formally closed-out the eight individual NVOCC petitions filed in 2003 and 2004 seeking service 
contract authority. 
40 For example, the National Customs Brokers and Forwarders Association of America continue to call 
for the elimination of tariff publication requirement of the Shipping Act. See Bank, et al., supra note 
23 at p. 67. 
41 See “FMC Approves NVO Tariff Publication Exemption”, National Industrial Transportation 
League Notice, 19 February 2010, at p. 1-2; see also R.G. Edmonson, “FMC to Change Tariff Filing 
Requirements”, The Journal of Commerce Online, 18 February 2010. 
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decision was based on the Commission’s finding that granting the exemption within 
certain parameters and conditions will not result in substantial reduction in 
competition or be detrimental to commerce. In taking this action, the Commission 
noted that the exemption is voluntary in that NVOCCs may choose whether to utilize 
the exemption which only applies to licensed NVOCCs; and the exemption which is 
limited to rates as tariff rules must continue to be published. 
 
2.5. Evolution of the volume contract concept under the Rotterdam Rules and its 
economic implications 
 
Based on a proposal by the United States delegation,42 the Rotterdam Rules provide 
for volume contracts that allow the parties to enter into mutually negotiated 
agreements, subject to certain safeguards to derogate from the terms of the Rotterdam 
Rules, regardless of whether such derogation increases or decreases the carrier’s 
obligations. The United States proposal on the OLSA emphasized that flexibility 
should be granted whenever one or more shippers and one or more carriers enter into 
agreements providing for the transportation of a minimum volume of cargo in a series 
of shipments on vessels used in a liner service, and for which the shipper or shippers 
agree to pay a negotiated rate and tender a minimum volume of cargo. It is to be noted 
that the definition of volume contract as found in the Rotterdam Rules is broader than 
that of service contract under the United States Shipping Act of 1984, as it does not 
require the carrier to undertake any ‘defined service level’ or to commit to a certain 
rate or rate schedule. Instead, volume contract is defined solely by reference to the 
undertakings of the shipper to provide a certain quantity of goods for shipment. 
 
A volume contract is defined in article 1(2) of the Rotterdam Rules as “a contract of 
carriage that provides for the carriage of a specified quantity of cargo in a series of 
shipments during an agreed period of time. The specification of the quantity may 
include a minimum, a maximum or a certain range.” A transport document43 or 
electronic transport record44 may be issued in respect of each shipment. The word 
‘quantity’ and the illustrated methods of measurement, suggest bulk cargo carried in 
the hold of a ship or containerized goods. Based on such presumptions a volume 
contract might take the form of a liner contract45 or a non-liner contract46. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 See, “Proposal by the United States of America, Ocean liner service agreements”, UN Doc 
A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.34, paras. 18-29, at pp. 6-9. 
43 Article 1(14) of the Rotterdam Rules defines “transport document” as a document issued under a 
contract of carriage by the carrier that: (a) Evidences the carrier’s or a performing party’s receipt of 
goods under a contract of carriage; and (b) Evidences or contains a contract of carriage. 
44 Article 1(18) of the Rotterdam Rules defines “electronic transport record” as information in one or 
more messages issued by electronic communication under a contract of carriage by a carrier, including 
information logically associated with the electronic transport record by attachments or otherwise linked 
to the electronic transport record contemporaneously with or subsequent to its issue by the carrier, so as 
to become part of the electronic transport record, that: (a) Evidences the carrier’s or a performing 
party’s receipt of goods under a contract of carriage; and (b) Evidences or contains a contract of 
carriage. 
45 “Liner shipping” is an industry term of art which means regularly scheduled common carriage of 
cargo by sea, which is now by far the predominant means of ocean transport but which has only existed 
since about the time of the Civil War; see Amos Herman, Shipping Conferences, Deventer, 
Netherlands; Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, (1983). Article 1(3) of the Rotterdam 
Rules defines “liner transportation” as a transportation service that is offered to the public through 
publication or similar means and includes transportation by ships operating on a regular schedule 
between specified ports in accordance with publicly available timetables of sailing dates. 
	   24 
 
Existing research shows that the volume contract concept promotes efficiency in 
seamless transportation of goods which forms part of the global supply chain 
management.47 The object of global supply chain management is to link the market 
place, distribution network, manufacturing or processing or assembly process and 
procurement activity in such a way that customers are serviced at a higher level, yet at 
a lower cost, in a computer literate environment operating within a global 
infrastructure.48  Volume contracts can also serve as the potential backbone for 
multimodal carriage of goods facilitated by containerisation which has become the 
norm for movement of non-bulk goods worldwide. 
 
As explained earlier, containerised seaborne trade is served by shipping lines offering 
scheduled services and their operations are evolving as part of the global supply chain 
management. Thus, apart from providing traditional maritime services, carriers are 
entering into international logistics activities, impacting on the role of traditional 
logistics providers whose core activities have not been in the maritime segment of 
international transport.49 This process allows shippers the advantage of comparing 
through-rates rather than rates of different unimodal legs of one shipment which is 
generally more complex. But comparisons of unimodal leg rates have become easier 
with increasing sophistication in computers. Furthermore, a recent counter-trend 
seems to have emerged where shipping lines do not want to be responsible for the 
through movement, but only for the part they can control, i.e., the sea leg.  
 
The above observations indicate that the tripartite phenomena of technological 
advancement, current business models and globalization of trade have created the 
need for contractual arrangements between carriers and shippers which is best served 
by the volume contract concept. It is envisaged that volume contracts being contracts 
of carriage will not only foster economic efficiency but will also provide the 
advantage of a legal framework within which those trading through volume contracts 
can operate under the carriage liability regime of the Rotterdam Rules. It is also of 
significance that volume contracts and the maritime-plus50 approach being within the 
scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules, the global supply chain management 
phenomenon is well served. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Article 1(4) of the Rotterdam Rules defines “non-liner transportation” as any transportation that is 
not liner transportation. 
47 See Mukherjee & Basu Bal, supra note 18. 
48 The preface to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly during the adoption of the Rotterdam 
Rules considers this by pointing out “... Believing that the adoption of uniform rules to govern 
international contracts of carriage wholly or partly by sea will promote legal certainty, improve the 
efficiency of international carriage of goods and facilitate new access opportunities for previously 
remote parties and markets, thus playing a fundamental role in promoting trade and economic 
development, both domestically and internationally, …”; see Resolution adopted by the General 
Assembly on the report of the Sixth Committee (A/63/438), United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, UN Doc. A/RES/63/122. 
49 See Peter Marlow, Rawindaran Nair, “Service contracts - An instrument of international logistics 
supply chain: Under United States and European Union regulatory frameworks”, Marine Policy 32 
(2008) at p. 493. 
50 See for example, Proposal by the Netherlands on the application door-to-door of the instrument, UN 
Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.33, para. 1(c). 
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2.6. Concluding remarks 
 
The Rotterdam Rules govern the legal relationship between carriers and shippers in 
terms of facilitating the free flow of trade in a manner as economically efficient as 
possible. As has been discussed, within the service contract regime from which the 
volume contract concept is derived there are some winners and some losers. There is 
an air of functional tension between equity and efficiency fostering healthy debate.  
 
In the context of this discussion it is important to recognize the fact that the service 
contract regime is simply one that provides for open market negotiation of economic 
trade advantages between carrier and shipper which in effect stimulates competition. 
It is recognized in this vein that the liner conference system on the face of it is 
discriminatory in nature; it runs afoul of the basic tenets of anti-trust or anti-combines 
laws. Even so, governments recognize that while competition is a good thing, 
cutthroat competition spells inefficiency. They have thus in their wisdom caused 
legislation to be enacted which endorses the conference system and provides it 
immunity from the anti-trust or anti-combines laws in their jurisdictions.  
 
In the United States, OSRA has achieved the technique of combining free market 
conditions with limited controls over that freedom providing a generally workable 
solution acceptable to both carriers and shippers.  Other jurisdictions may be able to 
avail of similar free market conditions through the introduction of volume contracts 
which might have been achieved through liner conference reviews. In the opinion of 
the authors, introducing the notion of service contracts through volume contracts in 
the Rotterdam Rules to other jurisdictions is more than picking fruit ripened on the 
trees of a decade of commercial and deregulatory experience in the US. A proper 
understanding of the trade aspects of volume contracts will help governments to 
decide whether or not to accept the Rotterdam Rules taking account of their respective 
constitutional dictates. The ensuing financial analysis is an attempt to facilitate 
legislators in understanding the consequences of the evolving commercial and 
business issues related to the liner shipping industry, which the Rotterdam Rules 
might govern if it enters into force in the future. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
EFFECT ON RISK DUE TO MARKET CHANGES IN  
LINER SHIPPING AND CONSOLIDATION BUSINESSES  
 
The reorganisation of the liner shipping market that was triggered world-wide by 
regulatory changes in the US followed by several other jurisdictions has been 
described in some detail in the previous chapter. This chapter discusses the main 
factors which affect the systematic risk and influence the level of competition in liner 
shipping and cargo consolidation market. The chapter then goes on to discuss the 
event study approach including some of its limitations followed by examination of 
financial models dealing with regulatory changes and changes in market power.  
 
3.1. Factors affecting market risk   
 
For the purpose of analysis made in this thesis, the main factors which affect the 
systematic risk and influence the level of competition in liner shipping and cargo 
consolidation market are –  
 
(i) the existence of protectionism hindering competition or legislation 
providing for antitrust exemption to liner shipping; 
(ii) the number and distribution of firms operating in the liner shipping 
market;  
(iii) the extent to which these liner shipping firms compete against each other 
and cooperate with each other; and 
(iv) the emergence of cargo consolidators acting as large shippers through 
service contract parity. 
 
The sample period chosen for the liner shipping companies is January 1980 to March 
2013, during which the world liner shipping market has seen extensive changes. The 
various factors which affected liner shipping may be categorised as changes caused 
due to revision in regulation and alteration in market power. One study, which 
focussed on regulatory changes in inter-company behaviour in liner shipping, 
observed that the behaviour of companies altered between 1980 and 2000.51 A similar 
approach is adopted in this thesis in reviewing the relevant liner shipping companies. 
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, the passage of the 1984 Act and the subsequent 
amendment through OSRA in 1998 paved the path for deregulation in the US and 
promote competition in liner shipping. The subsequent demise of the conference 
system in Europe and in other jurisdictions furthered the deregulatory process across 
the globe although none of them introduced the service contract mechanism like the 
US. It is instructive to note at this point that out of the top twenty-five liner shipping 
companies in the world, two are based in Western Europe while most of the others are 
headquartered in Asia. None of the American liner companies feature in the top 
twenty-five list. It is also to be noted that states which identify themselves primarily 
with cargo owning interests may also be major flag states regardless of whether they 
operate in an open or closed registry system or any other alternative type of registry. 
Therefore, the assumption that there is a divide between traditional maritime states as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ravinder Nair, Economic Regulation and Structural Change, VDM: Saarbrucken, Germany, 2009. 
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representing carrier interests and developing countries with primarily cargo owning 
interests is no longer valid. The advent of multiple registry types leading to varieties 
of flag states has in practical terms obliterated the original polarized characteristics of 
states opting for a carrier friendly regime nurturing the century-old conference 
system.   
 
The deregulatory move along with the service contract mechanism found in the US 
affected the global liner shipping industry to a great extent as US is one of the largest 
trading countries in the world. Liner shipping caters to a substantial part of this 
international trade flow to and from the US. The liner carriers in the wake of 
deregulation established new inter-company strategic cooperation after the passage of 
the 1984 Act to stabilize competition.52 Thirteen major liner shipping companies 
established the Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (TSA) in 1989. Similarly, the 
Westbound Transpacific Stabilization Agreement was established in 1991, and the 
Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement in 1994. Under TSA, companies exchange 
information about demand and supply to stabilise competition, and formulate 
guidelines for mark-up on the freight rate. In addition to these, a global alliance to 
construct a worldwide network emerged in the mid-1990s.53  
 
Turning to the consolidation companies, during the early 1990’s traditional freight 
forwarders found a business opportunity in the liberalised transportation sector. With 
the advent of service contracts in the US, the roles of third party agents in negotiating 
contracts became more valuable.  Along with the many duties that traditional freight 
forwarders carry out at present, 54 they became more involved in cargo consolidation 
and rate negotiating. Freight forwarders used their influence to generate service 
contracts that shippers cannot acquire on their own. The leverage of the freight 
forwarder was derived from its contracts, experience, reputation, and large volume 
shipments. Rate negotiation is a time-intensive job which requires the extensive 
facilitation and has to be conducted skilfully with carriers.   
 
The freight forwarders or third-party agents, referred to as consolidators in this thesis, 
consolidate shipments to create large-volume recurrent lots. Third-party agents may 
or may not do any rate negotiating for their customers. However, rate negotiating 
third-party agents has gained increased popularity under the service contract regime. 
Third party logistics providers (popularly referred to as 3PL, or sometimes TPL) carry 
out the practice of using third party agents to benefit small and medium shippers. A 
3PL is a firm (third party), neither shipper (first party) nor carrier (second party), that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See in general D K Ryoo and T W Lee, “The role of liner shipping co-operation in business strategy 
and the impact of the financial crisis on Korean liner shipping industries” in C. Th. Grammenos (ed.), 
The Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business, London and Hong Kong: LLP, 2002, at pp. 346–
374; See also Ravinder Nair, ibid. 
53 M Fusillo, “Structural factors underlying mergers and acquisitions in liner shipping”, Maritime 
Economics and Logistics, 2009, Vol. 11(2), at pp. 209–226, examines the factors affecting mergers and 
acquisitions after the OSRA was enacted. 
54 Traditionally, the responsibilities of freight forwarders were simply logistical matters. Their tasks 
included booking space with a carrier, obtaining export clearance, arranging for products to be 
containerized, completing export documentation, assembling cargo insurance, advising on domestic 
and foreign regulations, and contributing assistance on labelling, marking and packaging for the 
shipper. Many shippers have strong connections with their freight forwarders because of the variety of 
personalized tasks the freight forwarders offer to their customers.  Many shippers distinguish their 
relationship as one of partnership rather than a customer relationship. 
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provides a one stop shop service to its customers of outsourced logistics services for 
part, or all of their supply chain management functions. Third party logistics 
providers typically specialize in integrated operations, warehousing and transportation 
services that can be scaled and customized to customer’s needs based on market 
conditions and the demands and delivery service requirements for their products and 
materials. This is in line with the contemporary notion of outsourcing of roles by 
private firms so that they can be more focused on their core business. On the other 
hand, this became a new business opportunity for logistics firms.55 Emergence of 
fourth-party logistics (4PL), which acts as an integrator that assembles the resources, 
capabilities and technology of its own organisation and other organisations to design, 
build and run comprehensive supply chain solutions has widened the revenue earning 
scope of the logistics industry. Meanwhile, the fifth party logistics (5PL) will use e-
procurement to carry out full-scale operation. A key function of the 5PL is to 
aggregate the demands of the 3PL into a bulky volume for negotiating more 
favourable rates with transportation companies regardless of which generation of 
logistics solution belongs to all. The figure below shows in diagrammatic form the 
various functions of different logistics service providers. 
 
 
 
 
In order for 3PL to provide quality services, there are some important conditions. 
First, there must be available, capable logistics firms which have global coordination 
networks, suitable information and communication technologies, and familiarity with 
customs or trade rules and regulations in various countries where their clients have 
businesses. Second, the regulatory environment in countries, where 3PL firms can 
operate, needs to allow and foster such services. Third, there needs to be a vigorous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 It is interesting to note that advancements in technology and the associated increases in supply chain 
visibility and inter-company communications have given rise to a relatively new model for third-party 
logistics operations – the “non-asset based logistics provider.” Non-asset based providers perform 
functions such as consultation on packaging and transportation, freight quoting, financial settlement, 
auditing, tracking, customer service and issue resolution. However, they do not own any physical 
freight distribution assets of their own. A non-assets based provider consists of a team of domain 
experts with accumulated freight industry expertise and information technology assets. They fill a role 
similar to freight agents or brokers, but maintain a significantly greater degree of “hands on” 
involvement in the transportation of products. To be useful, such providers must show its customers a 
benefit in financial and operational terms by leveraging exceptional expertise and ability in the areas of 
operations, negotiations, and customer service in a way that complements its customers’ pre-existing 
physical assets. 
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competitive market among logistics providers in order for smaller and medium 
shippers to benefit. As discussed above, no one or a small group of these companies 
has a commanding market share. 
 
Pursuant to the discussion presented above, in analysing the stock prices of liner 
shipping companies, the sample period is divided into three parts; first to observe the 
effect of deregulation in the US and then the subsequent cooperation between 
companies.  The January 1980 to March 2013 dataset, depending on the availability of 
data for specific companies, is divided in three phases. The first period is from 1980 
to 1989, the second from 1990 to 1997, and the third from 1998 to 2013. The first 
period marks the phase of increasing competition because of the 1984 Act. During the 
second period, the degree of competition decreased because of cooperative 
arrangements between liner shipping companies while mergers or acquisitions took 
place to increase market concentration. In the beginning of the third period OSRA is 
enacted thereby making the use of service contracts extremely popular with carriers 
and large shippers. 
 
The sample period in analysing the stock prices of consolidation companies is also 
divided into three parts, to observe the effect of deregulation in the US introduced 
through the NSA rule. The January 1988 to March 2013 dataset, depending on the 
availability of data for specific companies, is divided in three parts. The first period is 
from 1988 to 2004, the second from 2005 to 2009, and the third from 2010 to 2013. 
The first period marks the phase when consolidators were not allowed to enter into 
service contracts. During the second period, the firms registered in the US were 
allowed to enter into service contracts although with stricter publication requirements. 
Finally, the third period when consolidation firms were allowed to enter into service 
contracts with less publication requirements.  
 
It is notable that the global financial crisis affected world trade and the liner shipping 
and cargo consolidation industry in 2008. The effects of the crisis are evident from 
some parts of the data but no detailed comments will be presented in this thesis while 
analysing the data. The details of data and period division are described in Chapter 4. 
 
3.2. Challenges for measurements using the event study approach 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, one of the main factors central to the changes in the 
market environment is change in regulation. Policy changes, for example, made 
through amendment of laws, promulgation of new laws, or passing of a new decision 
by a regulatory body are those events which influences the stock price and value of 
the firm. The event-study approach is a representative method for analysing the events 
affecting a firm’s value represented through the stock price when an event that has an 
impact on the market occurs. The aim of such a study is to measure how firm’s value 
changes due to economic events where such events can be M&A, accounting 
information, new debt or equity, or when macroeconomic variables are announced. In 
this thesis, the approach used is analysing the liner shipping stocks is similar to that of 
one study examining the relationship between CAPM-β and market changes in the 
Japanese liner shipping industry.56 The event study approach has been used by several 
other studies in analysing the usefulness of share returns to measure the effects of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Tezuka, et al, supra note 2. 
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regulation on the power industry even though the time when the change of market 
expectations is not known.57 Another study, which used this approach to investigate 
the changes of stock market price of liner shipping companies due to mergers and 
acquisitions, found that the prices changed notably and it was consistent with other 
studies in finance literature. The study found that the announcement of merger or 
acquisition has a significant and positive effect on the stock price.58 
 
The event study approach is not independent of challenges. While the approach is 
often used to analyse impact of a certain development, one study indicates its 
limitations.59 The first limitation is related to specifying the occurrence of the event. 
Since this approach examines the reaction of stock prices to additional news in the 
market, it is based on the assumption that the time of an event is identified clearly. 
However, in law making, several steps are necessary which may take a long period of 
time. Therefore, it becomes difficult to specify the point at which an event happens. 
One commentator states that not knowing when the market takes into account the 
change for the future cash flows is the main limitation to find how powerful is the 
impact of the regulation on changes in the share price.60  Legalistically speaking, the 
passage of a new law or amending a new law takes effect from a certain date. 
However, the above-noted criticisms of the event study approach holds ground to a 
certain extent, particularly because of the fact that lawmakers consult the various 
stakeholders in the industry concerned during the law making process. The 
stakeholders, during the negotiation process with lawmakers, often anticipate the 
changes to be brought about in the market upon the entry into force of the new law 
and starts realigning their businesses to survive in the new regulatory environment.  
The second limitation relates to the fact that introduction of regulatory change affects 
parts of the industry differently, both in positive and negative ways.61 This limitation 
is observable in this study as well if the maritime consolidation business is seen as a 
part of the larger liner shipping industry. Also notable in this context is that many 
large liner carriers have invested in the cargo consolidation business along with new 
investments made in providing supply chain management services.62 
 
To obtain significant results, the time when an event happens and its effects has to be 
clear. The use of event study approach is not always suitable when looking at the 
effects of changes in institutions. Another important challenge of the event-study 
approach is the possibility that the composition of the risk can change itself in the 
market environment.63 There is an assumption that the β does not change and it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 See G W Schwert, “Using financial data to measure effect of regulation”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 24, 1981, at pp. 121–158.; K Schipper and R Thompson, “The impact of merger-related 
regulations on the shareholders of acquiring firms”, Journal of Accounting Research, 21(1) 1983, at 
pp.184–221; J J Binder, “Measuring the effects of regulation with stock price data”, The RAND Journal 
of Economics, 16(2) 1985, at pp. 167–183. 
58 See P Panayides and X Gong, “The stock market reaction to merger and acquisition announcements 
in liner shipping”, International Journal of Maritime Economics, 4, 2002 at pp. 55–80. 
59 J J Binder, “The event study methodology since 1969”, Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 11(2), 198, at pp. 111–137. 
60 G W Schwert, supra note 57. 
61 P A Grout, A Zalewska, “The impact of regulation on market risk”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
80, 2006, at pp.149–184. 
62 For example, Maersk Group, which owns Maersk Line - the largest container shipping company in 
the world with 15% market share in liner shipping, also owns Damco - one of the world’s largest 
providers of freight forwarding and supply chain management services. 
63 Tezuka, supra note 2. 
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constant over time. If the β varies over time then adopting such an approach is not 
useful. It is, however, a stylized fact of empirical evidence that βs are not stable over 
time, with evidence on β instability dating back to the early 1970s.64.  Moreover, there 
is evidence in a study that US transportation industry has a time-varying β.65 
 
The risk configuration of the whole industry could be affected due to major changes 
in market power and regulation, rendering the event-study approach inapplicable. In 
this thesis, the time-series relationships between the market structure and systematic 
risk in liner shipping and consolidation businesses are observed. 
 
3.3. Regulatory changes affecting the liner shipping and consolidation market 
 
Liner shipping which transports a substantial portion of international trade has seen 
varying economic regulations imposed over decades.66 For the purpose of conducting 
the financial analysis in this thesis it is essential to consider the relationship between 
economic regulation and β. Although a study on the effects of deregulation on β is 
uncommon in the field of shipping, they are relatively common in the field of public 
service, such as the electric power industry. In the transportation industry, one study 
focussing on the regulatory changes in the railroad sector was conducted to estimate 
the path of β.67 It was found that after introduction of new economic regulations, β 
decreases, but not significantly. In analysing the US power industry, another study 
found that the level and intensity of regulation has a strong effect on the systematic 
risk.68 It was depicted in that study that systematic risk is endogenous and is lower 
when the degree of regulation is more intense. Other investigations examining the 
effects of use of fuel adjustment clauses found that when used by electric utilities 
companies, the systematic risk changes.69 They estimate the effects of introducing 
fuel cost regulations on each firm’s equity in the US power industry. 
 
The remainder of this section briefly discusses some of the models which were used 
by various scholars to analyse the relationship between regulations and a firm’s risks. 
Grout and Zalewska70 looked at the profit-sharing regulations and their effects on a 
company’s risk. They gave a simple theoretical illustration as to why the changes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See R Buckland, P Fraser, “ Political and regulatory risk: Beta sensitivity in U.K. electricity 
distribution”, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 19, 2001, at pp. 5–25, referring to studies conducted 
by various scholars such as Blume in 1971 and 1975, Gonedes in 1973, Meyers in 1973 and Baesel in 
1974. 
65 S X Gong, M Firth, K Cullinane, “Beta estimation and stability in the US-listed international 
transportation industry”, Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 9(3), 2006 at pp. 
463–490. 
66 See B Gardner, P Marlow, R Nair, “ The economic regulation of liner shipping: The impact of US 
and EU regulation in US trades” in C. Th. Grammenos (ed.), The Handbook of Maritime Economics 
and Business, London and Hong Kong: LLP, 2002, at pp. 327–346; see also, Nair, supra note 51. 
67 See S Peltzman, “Toward a more general theory of regulation”, Journal of Law and Economics, 19, 
1976 at pp. 211–246. 
68 See S W Norton, “Regulation and systematic risk: The case of electric utilities”, Journal of Law and 
Economics, 28, 1985 at pp. 671–686. 
69 See F Scott, “Fuel-adjustment clauses and profit risk” in M A Crew (ed.) Issues in Public-Utility 
Pricing and Regulation, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1980, at pp. 77–92; see also S W Norton, 
“Regulation and systematic risk: The case of electric utilities”, Journal of Law and Economics, 28, 
1985 at pp. 671–686. 
70 P A Grout, A Zalewska, “The impact of regulation on market risk”, Journal of Financial Economics, 
80, 2006 at pp. 149–184. 
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regulations have an effect on a firm’s risk. Under a profit-sharing regulation, the 
profit of a firm can be represented as a restricted deviation around target profit level: 
 𝜋 = 𝜋∗ +   𝛾(𝜋 − 𝜋∗) 
 
where 𝜋∗ is target profit level, 𝛾 < 1 is a positive constant representing the proportion 
of profit the firm is allowed to keep if its profit exceeds the target profit and 𝜋 is the 
profit the company would earn under price-cap regulation. 
 
After derivation, they get that under the profit-sharing regulation, the systematic risk 
is: 
 𝛽 = 𝛾𝛽 
 
where β is systematic risk without profit-sharing regulation. A profit sharing β is a 
proportion 𝛾 of price-cap β. If there is more profit sharing, the lower is 𝛾 and the 
lower is systematic risk of a firm. 
 
Binder and Norton used a different model to find regulations effect on systematic 
risk.71 They constructed a one-period model where a relationship between β and 
competitive market was formalised. They assumed that by setting prices, the regulator 
has control of entry and surplus allocation. The study tested “buffering hypothesis” 
which means that rate-of-return regulation reduces firm’s exposure to market risk as 
compared to no regulation.72 The equation of systematic risk of equity for company i 
used in the study is as follows: 
 𝛽! = 1− 𝜃 ∗   𝑝! − 𝑤!𝐸 𝑄!𝑉!   ∗   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑈! ,𝑅!)𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑅!  
 
where 𝜃 is buffer parameter and it is from 0 to 1. It is a ratio between the level of 
regulation and the level of competition. E(Qi) = 𝑄! + Ui is expected output, 𝑄! is 
determined variable and Ui is random variable which is demand shock and E(Ui) = 0. 
New policies which are in favour of competition, decreases the value of 𝜃 and 
increases β, if all things are constant. 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that β is expected to decrease for liner shipping 
companies if the market is protected through price regulation or antitrust exemptions 
which suppresses competition. Applying the above reasoning to the liner shipping 
market, it is reasonable to expect that β would rise as a consequence of the passage of 
the 1984 Act and the subsequent promulgation of OSRA in 1998, which raised global 
competition within the liner shipping industry. On the other hand, in 2004 and 2010, it 
is expected that β will decrease within the consolidation industry, as the deregulated 
market environment is more favourable for them. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  J J Binder, S W Norton, “Regulation, profit variability and beta” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
15, 1999, at p. 249–265. 
72 The buffering hypothesis was proposed by Peltzman. See Peltzman, supra note 67. The results of the 
analysis in Binder and Norton’s study supported Pletzman’s hypothesis. 
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3.4. Changes in market power 
 
The instant thesis also focuses on the cooperative behaviour of liner shipping firms 
and market power. Current studies on market competition and collusion in the liner 
shipping industry is summarised by Sjostrom. 73  He categorises liner shipping 
conferences under four distinctive models, namely, monopolistic cartels, contestable 
markets, destructive competition and empty cores. Firstly, a link between market 
power and market β has to be made, before an analysis on the effects of the change in 
market structure indicated by market concentration ratio and other risk factor in the 
liner shipping industry is made. Prior studies on this relationship between market 
power and β are described in the remainder of this section. 
 
A study from the 1980’s show that companies with higher monopoly power will have 
lower β.74 Moreover, it was stated that market power and capital intensity are 
interactive causes of systematic risk. Another study finds that there is no strong 
relationship between an individual company’s market power and its risk, but there 
exist a strong negative relationship between industry concentration and the market 
risk of the firms industry.75 
 
A study by Alexander and Thistle showed a negatively correlated systematic risk, 
oligopolistic product market and size of a firm. They state that this negative 
correlation between systematic risk and size of a firm can be due to market power, 
entry barriers or differential efficiency. Concentration due to entry barriers is 
negatively correlated with systematic risk, while concentration due to differential 
efficiency may be either positively or negatively correlated with systematic risk.76 
 
Other studies show that there are some conditions to have such a relationship. Binder 
in his theoretical work states that market concentration and systematic risk do not 
necessarily have a relationship, if they compete in a perfect market with different 
technologies.77 Wong points out a different relationship between systematic risk and 
markets where there exist oligopolistic competition.78 A negative relationship is 
showed and only if all firms employ the same production technology.  
 
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is used to measure the market concentration 
in the liner shipping industry by calculating the market concentration ratio. The main 
advantage of using HHI is that it takes into account the number of liner shipping 
companies and differences of their market shares. One investigation concerning the 
market concentration in the liner shipping industry raised the issue of whether or not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 W Sjostrom, “Liner shipping: Modelling competition and collusion” in C. Th. Grammenos (ed.) The 
Handbook of Maritime Economics and Business, London and Hong Kong: LLP, 2002, at pp. 375–396. 
74 M G Subrahmanyam, S B Thomadakis, “Systematic risk and the theory of the firm”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 94, 1980, at p. 437–451. 
75 R C Moyer, R Chatfield, “Market power and systematic risk”, Journal of Economics and Business, 
35, 1983, at pp. 123–130. 
76 D L Alexander, P D Thistle, “Market power efficiency and the dispersion of systematic risk”, Review 
of Industrial Organization, 14, 1999, at pp. 377–390. 
77 J J Binder, “Beta, firm size and concentration”, Economic Inquiry, 30, 1992 at pp. 556–563. 
78 K P Wong, “Cournot oligopoly and systematic risk”, Journal of Economics and Business, 46, 1995 
at pp. 227–233. 
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there existed an oligopoly during the period between 1999 and 2009. 79 The study 
concluded that liner shipping market is characterised by increased concentration. On 
the other hand, this industry may still be considered as fragmented when compared to 
other industries, such as, banking, media and air transport.80  It is instructive to note 
that although this thesis is dealing with a larger sample period than the period 
considered in the aforesaid study, but the sample period of the latter falls within the 
sample period of the former. For the period between 1980 to 1999 CR4 concentration 
ratio is used. CR4 is the simplest concentration measure which shows the cumulative 
share of 4 largest liner shipping companies in the market.81   The next chapter shows 
that the liner shipping market stabilised since 1999 and the observatory point chosen 
in this thesis shows that greater market power reduces β. 
 
The cargo consolidation industry has historically been a fragmented one. Small local 
players based in one location could compete with larger forwarders by using their 
agility and industry knowledge. The HHI figures for consolidators for the period from 
2005 to 2010 is extracted from a study available online.82 Through 2005 to the 
beginning of 2007 the HHI for the consolidation industry drifted downwards to 205 
implying that the larger players were losing market-share. However, by 2008 the 
market structure appears to turn remarkably, increasing to 227 in that year and 
continuing to climb steadily to 258 in 2010. The quantitative change is not huge but 
the trend is clear. The industry is undergoing change with greater power gravitating 
towards the top ten consolidators.83   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 C Sys, “Is the container liner shipping industry an oligopoly?” Transport Policy, 16, 2009 at pp. 
259–270. 
80 The liner shipping industry may be considered still fragmented as HHI values are lower than 1000 
which is the marker for more concentrated sectors. The figure1000 would indicate a sector with large 
players with substantial pricing power. 
81 C Sys, “Measuring concentration in the container liner shipping industry”, Proceedings of  
the NECTAR Conference, Porto, 2007. 
82 See “Leading freight forwarders increase market dominance” available online at 
http://www.eft.com/freight-transport/exclusive-leading-freight-forwarders-increase-market-dominance. 
83 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND ESTIMATION MODELS 
 
In this chapter, the sample data is described followed by a discussion on the proposed 
observatory points for the purpose of the financial analysis. 
 
4.1. Data resource  
 
The data resource involves two co-existing businesses, namely, liner shipping 
companies and cargo consolidators.  
 
For liner shipping, some of the largest publicly traded companies are selected across 
various jurisdictions after perusing the list of top 30 companies.84 The data includes 
stock prices of the following liner carriers:  
 
Country85 Name of the Parent Company of the 
Liner Shipping Company 
% of Market 
Share in 2012 
Stock Exchange 
Traded 
 
Denmark AP Moeller - Maersk A/S 15.2 Copenhagen 
 
Hong Kong China Shipping Container Lines Company 
Limited 
 
Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
 
3.5 
 
 
2.9 
 
Hong Kong 
 
 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan Evergreen Marine Corp 
 
Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp 
 
Wan Hai Lines Ltd. 
 
4.3 
 
2.1 
 
0.9 
Taiwan 
 
Taiwan 
 
Taiwan 
Korea Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd 
 
3.7 Korea 
Chile Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA 
(CSAV) 
1.5 Santiago 
 
The above listed companies comprises of approximately one-third of the total liner 
shipping market. It is notable that most of the liner-shipping companies listed above 
are subsidiaries of their respective parent companies. Generally, the parent company 
has other shipping related businesses which are registered as separate subsidiaries. 
The data used in this thesis are stock prices of the parent company, shares of which 
are publicly traded. The authors of the thesis are aware that the stock prices of the 
parent company might be affected due to changes in circumstances of other 
businesses of the parent but it is submitted that liner shipping constitutes as their 
primary business. Therefore, the authors choose to use the stock prices of the parent 
company, as the results of the analysis would not differ to any considerable extent. 
 
For global cargo consolidation and freight forwarding industry, some of the largest 
publicly traded companies are selected across various jurisdictions after perusing the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 See Alphaliner, available online at http://www.alphaliner.com/top100/ 
85 The country mentioned herein represents where the liner shipping company is headquartered. The 
companies are listed countrywise to aid jurisdiction specific analysis. 
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list of top 25 companies. 86  The data include stock prices of the following 
consolidators:  
 
Country Name of the Consolidation Company Ocean TEUs in 
2012 
Stock Exchange 
Traded 
 
United States UPS Supply Chain Solutions 
 
Expeditors International of Washington 
 
UTi Worldwide Inc 
 
C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc 
 
500,000 
 
892,682 
 
484,000 
 
262,117 
NASDAQ 
 
NASDAQ 
 
NASDAQ 
 
NASDAQ 
Germany DHL 2,724,000 
 
Frankfurt 
Switzerland Kuehne + Nagel International Ltd 
 
Panalpina 
3,274,000 
 
1,310,000 
 
SIX 
 
SIX 
Denmark DSV A/S 
 
727,861 Copenhagen 
Australia Toll 520,000 ASX 
 
The above listed cargo consolidation companies operate in both airfreight and ocean 
shipping markets. The stock prices of these companies might be affected due to 
changes in circumstances of airfreight industry as well as the ocean shipping industry.  
However, ocean transport forms a substantial part of their business, as represented by 
the TEU figures. Therefore, the authors choose to use the stock prices of these 
companies, as the results of the analysis would not differ to any considerable extent. 
 
When there are more than one company for a particular country, then the average rate 
of log-return is taken to assess how the whole market was affected in that country. For 
the analysis, monthly rate of log-return on equity for each firm and the market-wide 
rate of log-return, calculated from stock price data on the Stock Exchanges. All data is 
collected with the help of DataStream. As this analysis requires risk-free rate and 
excess log-returns on markets, yield of 10-year government bonds are used as risk 
free rate except for US, Chile and Korea.87. The data is not adjusted for dividend 
returns, as each country has different tax implications. Moreover, some of the market 
indices used do not have adjustments for dividend returns. Also, for the robustness 
check, SMB and HML factors are employed.88 Possibly, larger samples would let to 
see a longer time-varying β but the main intention is to find the effects of changes in 
regulation on the liner shipping and consolidation businesses by looking at long-term 
behaviour of β. To test whether the data contains unit-root, augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests were performed. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Patrick Burnson, “Top 25 Freight Forwarders: Thriving in the complexity”, available online at 
http://www.logisticsmgmt.com/article/top_25_freight_forwarders_thriving_in_the_complexity 
87 The data available for US and Chile is the yield of 20 year government bonds while for Korea is the 
yield of 3 year government bonds 
88 See K Kubota, H Takehara, “Re-examination of the effects of Fama–French Factor model”, Modern 
Finance, 22, 2007, at pp. 3–23. 
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The descriptive statistics for liner shipping and consolidation companies are shown in 
Annexes I and II, respectively. There are five descriptive statistics in Annex I and five 
descriptive statistics in Annex II. They are shown in tabular form for each country. 
The acronyms, which are fully described in the list of abbreviations, represent 
company and market index log-returns. Acronyms are also given for each of the 
companies, market indices and averages. 
 
Before estimation, an examination of the data set is made to see if there are any 
outliers. For example, Table 2.1 in Annex I shows descriptive statistics of Hong Kong 
liner shipping companies, the average and Hang Seng index. The table shows that the 
maximum value of China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited is 0.446094, 
and the minimum value is -0.555867. The average value is -0.027908. Both minimum 
and maximum values look like outliers. If they are considered as outliers – they are 
deleted from the sample, as it can affect the β results. To see, if they are outliers, the 
first figures in both Annex I and Annex II show the line graphs of excess log-returns. 
As it can be seen in Figure 2.1, China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited 
has one outlier: in 2011 10, so the lowest value is removed. The highest value does 
not look like it was rare, more similar values can be seen, so it is not treated as an 
outlier. All parameters were checked, and if there were outliers – they are mentioned 
under each line graph of excess log-returns. 
 
4.2. Sample period and observatory points for liner shipping companies 
 
The path of time-varying β is plotted during the sample period from January 1980 to 
March 2013, depending on availability of data for specific liner shipping companies.89 
To observe long-term behaviour of β, the sample period is divided into three parts 
which are as follows:  
 
a) From January 1980 to December 1989: a period of increasing 
competition for liner shipping companies serving the Atlantic and 
Pacific routes to the US due to the introduction of the 1984 Act in the 
US which deregulated liner conferences thereby promoting competition.  
b) From January 1990 to May 1998: a period when competition was 
reduced in liner shipping through inter-firm cooperation. 
c) From June 1998 to March 2013: a period of increased competition due 
to the passage of the OSRA in May 1998 in the US. 
 
The two observatory points are as follows:  
 
Observatory point 1: New policies which promote competition or easing of 
regulation increase β. 
 
Observatory point 2: Increased concentration between firms or higher market power 
due to cooperation reduces β. 
 
The two points will be observed in the following fashion.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 The availability of data for each liner company is mentioned in Annex I of this thesis. 
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In the first instance, for period a) the values of β is observed before and after 1984, 
when the US Shipping Act was enacted. Observatory point 1 implies that β increases 
when the market protected by regulation is made to compete by the passage of the 
Shipping Act. So it is expected that systematic risk will rise during period a). 
 
In the second instance, during period b) and c), from the point of view of observatory 
point 2, the sample companies in the liner shipping industry seem to have a decreased 
competition as inter-firm cooperation came into play as the TSA was initiated. 
Moreover, the HHI index during period 1999 to 2008 has nearly doubled. 
 
The third point notable in this context is that for period c), the 1998 OSRA which was 
promulgated to promote market competition should have impact for the structure of 
the market. Taking observatory point 1 into account, because of the new Act the β is 
expected to increase in the period c). On the other hand, due to observatory point 2, 
there was an increase in global alliances and market concentration during this period. 
All things considered, the β in period c) is expected to be flat or to be indecisive. 
 
In summary, during the period a) the β is expected to increase and to decrease during 
period b). Due to conflicting factors of observatory points 1 and 2, the β is indecisive.  
 
4.3. Sample period and observatory points for intermediaries 
 
For the consolidation business, the path of time-varying β is plotted during the sample 
period from January 1988–March 2013, depending on availability of data. Since most 
of the businesses are newly established, the sample period is shorter as compared to 
liner shipping companies.  
 
To observe behaviour of β, the sample period is divided into two parts which are as 
follows:  
 
a) From January 2004 to February 2010: a period when consolidators 
licensed in the US were allowed service contract parity through the 
NVOCC Service Arrangements (NSA) rule in December 2004, when 
dealing with their shipper-customers. 
b) From March 2010 to March 2013: a period when the publication 
requirements were relaxed in February 2010 which created a new wave 
of opportunity for consolidators. 
 
The two observatory points are as follows:  
 
Observatory point 1: Regulation providing increased business opportunity through 
forward contracting decreases β. 
 
Observatory point 2: Further changes in regulation providing increased business 
opportunity due to relaxed publication requirements decreases β. 
 
In summary, during period a) the β is expected to decrease and during period b) the β 
is expected to decrease further. 
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4.4. Estimation models 
 
4.4.1. Estimation models of CAPM β 
 
It is to be noted that the measure of factor sensitivity captures the degree of effect of 
how the return on each stock is changed due to changes in the market environment. 
The most popular systematic risk measure comes from the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), which is known as CAPM-β. CAPM is also a method used for the 
estimation of company’s cost of equity – the expected return that purchasers of 
common stock in the firm require. This is an important input for decisions when 
firm’s capital is raised and investments are made and when investors construct their 
portfolios.90 The equation is: 
 𝛽 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣  (𝑅! ,𝑅!)𝑉(𝑅!)  
 
Here Ri and is the returns of stock i and the market portfolio, and Cov (.,.) and V(.) are 
covariance and variance. 
 
In the thesis, the following model is used to estimate the β: 
 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,! =   𝛼! −   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,! 
 
Rmt denotes the log-return on the market portfolio at time t, Rft is the risk free rate at 
time t, and 𝜀 is a process of white noise. White noise has constant mean and variance, 
and zero autocovariances, except at lag zero (there is no correlation within 
observations with all other values appearing sequentially).91 
 
First of all, it is run as OLS regression which is also known as the classical linear 
regression model. The assumptions of OLS are - the errors have zero mean, the 
variance of the errors is constant and finite over all values of xt, the errors are linearly 
independent of one another, there is no relationship between the error and 
corresponding x variable and errors are normally distributed.92 
 
The next step is a GARCH (1,1) regression. GARCH model forms the most popular 
way through which the variance of returns can be modelled. 
 
The GARCH (1,1) model is described as follows: 
 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,! =   𝛼! −   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝑢!,! 
 𝑢!,! = 𝑧!,! ℎ!,! , ℎ!,! =   𝛼! +   𝛼!𝑢!,!!!! +   𝑦!ℎ!,!!! 
 𝑢!,! is error term for i at time t and ℎ!,! is conditional variance. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Michael R King, The cost of equity for global banks: a CAPM perspective from 1990 to 2009, BIS 
Quarterly review (September 2009): 59-73 
91 See in general, Chris Brooks, Introductory Econometrics for Finance, 2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press (2008). 
92 Ibid. 
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Using the GARCH it is possible to interpret the current value of the conditional 
variance as a weighted value (weighted by the estimated coefficients) of past squared 
error terms and past variances that departs from the mean value of the squared error 
terms. 
 
GARCH models are supposed to meet the non-negativity constraints in order to avoid 
negative variances through time. Usually, it is found that a GARCH (1,1) (i.e., 1 
lagged value of the squared errors and 1 lagged value of the conditional variance) are 
sufficient to capture the dynamics in volatility.93 
 
In Annex I there are tables which show OLS and GARCH (1,1) results for the liner 
shipping companies and averages, and in Annex II there are OLS and GARCH (1,1) 
results for the consolidation industry’s companies and averages.  
 
For the overview, all β coefficients are significant at 1% level, where constant terms 
in nearly all regressions are insignificant (both for OLS and GARCH (1,1) results and 
both industries). In general, the liner shipping industry has higher β values compared 
to the consolidation industry.  
 
The lowest value of β is in consolidation industry in the US, where UPS has only 
0.268 for OLS and 0.376 for GARCH (1,1). The highest value belongs to liner 
shipping industry, where China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited has 
CAPM- β 1.77 in OLS and 1.65 in GARCH (1,1). Mostly, OLS and GARCH (1,1) are 
close to each other. The biggest inconsistency is in UTi Worldwide Inc. where the 
result of OLS is 0.57 and for GARCH (1,1) 0.90 (figures 6.8 and 6.9 in Annex I), 
which is nearly double.  
 
For the comparison, Kavussanos et. al. estimated CAPM- β for shipping industry and 
they got 0.64-0.67 at 5% significance level.94 Drobetz et. al. estimated the systematic 
risk for the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and Germany shipping industries. 
Here they got 0.8749, 0.8456, 0.8909 and 1.3778, respectively.95 
 
For the comparison, Maersk which is a Danish company has OLS β 1.13 whereas the 
Taiwanese average β is 0.80. Thus, looking regionally, the markets which are close 
geographically have similar β coefficients (compared Denmark to Germany and 
Taiwan to Japan with the coefficients from Kavussanos et. al). On the other hand, 
Hong Kong’s average is 1.47 and Korean company Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. 
Ltd. has OLS of 1.21. Differences can be caused due to different sample periods, 
number of sample firms and estimating methods. For example, Drobetz et. al. use a 
seemingly unrelated regressor (SUR) to estimate systematic risk with one-factor and 
four-factor models. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Ibid. 94	  M. G. Kavussanos, S. N. Marcoulis, Risk and Return in Transportation and Other US and Global 
Industries, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 95	  W. Drobetz, D. Shilling, L. Tegtmeier, “Common risk factors in the returns of shipping stocks”, 
Maritime Policy and Management, 2010, 37(2), at pp. 93–120. 
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4.4.2. Time varying β and Kalman filter 
 
The ensuing text is mainly explanatory which introduces the use of Kalman filter. 
Since the values of β are different in the sample period, it is essential to estimate the 
time-variant path of β. It is assumed that β follows a process than can be expressed as 
follows: 
 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!" =   𝛼! +   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,! 
 𝛽!,! =   𝛽!,!!! + 𝑣! 
 
Traditional CAPM gives the theoretical background, and assuming a constant risk and 
return relationship96, the return generating process gives the following equation - 
 𝑅!,! = 𝑅! +   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,! 
 
By subtracting the risk free-rate from both sides we get equation: 
 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,! 
 
Then on the left side we have excess log-returns, and because of assumption that 
markets are efficient, 𝛼 is insignificantly different from zero. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to look at the β’s sensitivity to regulatory factors, so the 
equation from above becomes: 
 
  𝑅!,! − 𝑅!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,!  
 
Time-varying β is denoted by 𝛽!. 
 
In this thesis we focus on a time-varying model and use the Kalman Filter procedure 
for the maximum likelihood estimation of parameters of interest. 
 
By allowing time-variation to follow a process that can be described as: 
 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽! 𝑅!" −   𝑅!" +   𝜀!,! 
   𝛽!,! =   𝛽!,!!! + 𝑣! 
 
The first part is the same, the second describes the process that determines βi,t.. In this 
state representation of the Kalman filter, β of firm i at time t is determined from the 
previous time point βi,t-1 and white noise error term 𝑣! . A random walk is adopted 
which corresponds as a filter of the data. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 R Buckland, P Fraser, “Political and regulatory risk: Beta sensitivity in U.K. electricity distribution”, 
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 19, 2001, at pp. 5–25. 
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Once this is done, accuracy of the forecasts is assessed. To assess it, root mean square 
error (RMSE) is used, which is calculated: 
 
Where rit is 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!", and ‘hat’ denotes the ‘estimated’ risk premium. 
 
There are three steps are in the Kalman filter: prediction, correction, and smoothing. 
First, the value of the state variable is estimated with the use of initial values, and 
predicted value of the observable variable is calculated. After that, if there is a 
realisation of the value of the observable variable, the estimated value of the state 
variable must have a correction. This correction is dependent on the variance of 
estimated error. These two steps are carried out over the whole sample period. Lastly, 
the sequence of state variables is smoothed.97  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 For a detailed discussion on Kalman Filters see Peter S. Maybeck, Stochastic Models, Estimation 
and Control: Volume 1, Academic Press (1979) available online at 
http://www.cs.unc.edu/~welch/kalman/media/pdf/maybeck_ch1.pdf. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the empirical results of the study and provide both financial and 
legal interpretations as reflected through the results. All the tables and graphs for liner 
shipping companies and intermediaries are compiled in Annexes I and II, respectively. 
 
5.1. Estimated paths of time varying β for liner shipping companies 
 
In the figures showing the time-varying β of various liner shipping companies in 
Annex - I, the solid blue lines demonstrate the estimated smoothed time paths of β 
and the red lines show 95% RMSE confidence intervals. 
 
The first country in this analysis is Denmark, which is the home for one of the leading 
liner shipping company, namely Maersk98. Figure 1.2, which shows the time-varying 
β of Maersk, depicts that the β starts to increase gradually from 1993 till 2000. From 
2001 the β becomes flat and then there is slight decrease from 2008 onwards. It is not 
consistent with our expectations during the second period but is consistent during the 
third. 
 
The second country under investigation is Hong Kong. The time-varying β of Hong 
Kong companies is demonstrated in Figure 2.2, which includes the average of the two 
companies, namely CSCL and Orient Overseas. Due to lack of the data available, here 
we can look just at the time-varying β from 1997 (the third phase). The results of 
Orient Overseas Limited shows that from 1997 β decreases a little bit to 0.4 and then 
from 2000 to 2009 it steadily rose up to 1.2. During the next four years it decreased 
minimally and became flat. There is more variation in CSCL. From 2004 to 2007 the 
β was stable, and then from the middle of 2007 to 2008, the β rose from 1 to 2, then 
till 2009 it fluctuated a bit but remained at 1.9. Then it decreased in 2010 to 1.3 but 
slowly came back to 1.8 by the end of 2012. The average of these two companies 
does not have that many fluctuations. From 2004 to the beginning of 2007, the β is 
constant at 1.1. Thereafter, it rises and from 2007 to 2013 it is 1.3 with a fluctuation 
during 2007 – 2009 period. 
 
The third country is Taiwan. In Figure 3.2 it is seen that it is consistent with the 
various phases discussed under observatory points. Yang Ming Marine Transport 
Corp. has β of 1.1 in 1995, and it decreases till 2001 to 0.6. Then, from it rose up to 
1.5 in 2013. Similar view is for Wan Hai Lines Ltd., where it starts with 0.5 in 1996 
and it decreases to 0.1 in 2001. Then, in 2002, there is a sharp rise and it rises to 1.5 
by the end of 2012. 
 
Due to singular covariance matrix problem, it has not been possible to present time-
varying β of Evergreen Marine Corp. but it has been possible to demonstrate how the 
whole average of the 3 companies moved. It is seen that it 2001, the β decreases twice 
– from 1 to 0.5. That is the lowest value in the whole graph. Afterwards, there is a rise 
like in previous two companies, and it rises by three times up to 1.5. Thus, all three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 It is notable in this context that the revenue for Maersk Line in 2012 is 27,118 million USD, which is 
45% of the entire revenue generated by all businesses of Maersk. 
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Taiwanese graphs have similar view to what we expected, i.e., a decrease in β due to 
higher market power, and increase due to implementation of OSRA. 
 
The fourth country is Korea and the company investigated is called Hanjin Shipping 
Holdings Co. Ltd. How the β varied over the time can be seen in figure 4.2. Here a 
very similar view emerges as for the graphs in 3.2. Here the β once decreases from 
1995 to 1998 by 0.2. Then it is stable and from 2001 it starts to increase up till 2013 
and it increased from 1 to 1.7. 
 
Figure 5.2 depicts the graph for the liner shipping company CSAV from Chile during 
the period 1994 to 2013. Once again, a similar tendency as Taiwan and Korea is 
noticed. There is a stable β from 1994 to the middle of 2000. Then, the β starts to 
increase, and rises from 0.9 to 1.9. 
 
5.2. Estimated paths of time varying β for intermediaries 
 
This section describes the time varying β of consolidation industry. Starting with the 
country that has some of the leading consolidation companies in the world, in Annex 
– II, figure 6.2 demonstrates time varying β of US companies. There are four of them, 
and the average is shown as the US market’s β movement.  
 
The data for Expeditors International of Washington starts from 1985 and it has β 
equal to 1. By 2001, it reaches the minimum value as low to 0.4. From that time, the β 
stars to rise till 2006, then it’s flat to 2009. After 2009, it raises once again up to 
nearly 1 in 2011. After that, the β is flat with a slightly decreasing trend.  
 
The second consolidator company is C.H. Robinson. This company has less variation 
compared to the previous one. The company starts with β of 0.5 in 1998, and it’s 
CAPM- β decreases up to 0.35 in 2001. After that, the β stars to rise and by 2005 it 
goes up to 0.6. After that, the β becomes fairly flat and stable.  
 
The third company, UPS, demonstrates perfectly of what is expected from the 
described observatory points in Chapter 4.3. UPS starts in 2000 with a negative β with 
a little less than 0. It reaches 0.8 in 2004 (a sharp rise in β) and it starts to decrease. 
By 2009, the β is as low as 0.5. During the next 4 years, it goes up but after that that it 
once again starts to decline. That falls exactly in place with the expectations of the 
authors.  
 
The fourth company is UTi Worldwide Inc, which has really similar view to 
Expeditors International of Washington. The β rises from 2000 at 0.2 to 2006 where 
the β becomes equal to 1. Then it is flat till 2009. After that there is a slight increase 
followed by a slight decrease in the end period. 
 
Looking at the average of these companies, it is seen that there are less fluctuations 
and the β is in a lower interval (starts with 0.3 and ends with 0.9; while looking at 
single companies the lowest value was -0.05 and the highest was 1.1). There is a 
constant rise of β in the average of 4 companies. Only in 2011, it can be stated that the 
β stops to rise and subsequently decreases. Overall, two out of three periods show the 
view of the authors’ expectations. Up till 2004, β increased, and this is what was 
expected. From 2005 to 2010 there was a continuation of increase in β, while it was 
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expected to decrease. It is notable that a portion of this period marked the global 
financial crisis which affected the transportation and cargo consolidation business to a 
great extent. After that, from 2011 it is seen that β slowly starts to decrease and it 
once again falls in line with the authors’ expectations. 
 
For the second country, Germany, figure 7.2 demonstrates the time varying β of the 
Deutsche Post which owns DHL. In the first view, it looks like the company has a flat 
β. It varies just with 0.05. Here, the company starts with β 0.95 in 2000 and reaches 1 
in 2009. After that, the β starts to decrease very slowly. 
 
The third country for the consolidation industry is Switzerland. It has two publicly 
traded companies which are in top 25 freight forwarders list. The variations are 
demonstrated in figure 8.2.  
 
Kuehne Nagel has a very fluctuating CAPM- β. The company starts with β 0.9 in 
1994 and in 1997 it starts to decrease to reach 0.5 in 1998. Then there is a rise in 1999 
and in the middle of 2000 it returns to 0.5. Then, it starts to increase and in 2002 when 
it reaches its peak value of 1. Once again, it starts to decrease up to 0.4 in 2004. Then, 
the β increases and in 2009 has a value of 0.9. And from that period, the β decrease 
and in 2013 the value is 0.7. 
 
Panalpina has a different view. From 2005 to 2009 the β moves from 1 to 1.2. In the 
middle of 2009, it is seen that the β starts to decrease and in 2013 the β value is 0.75. 
 
A very similar view to Panalpina is seen in the average of two Swiss companies. The 
average starts with 0.8 in 2005. Similar to Panalpina, β increases till 2009 where it is 
0.95. Then, it starts to decrease and goes down to 0.5 in 2013. On the other hand, it is 
also very similar to Kuehne Nagel, where it also is increasing till 2009 and starts to 
decrease after that. The only difference is that it fluctuates while is decreasing. 
 
DSV is a Danish freight forwarder and it has a similar view to the expectations of the 
authors. It is seen that the company has a β of about 0.78 for 8 years beginning from 
1987. Then it rises up till 2009 and β is equal to 0.95. A decrease begins in 2010. It is 
not a sharp decrease but it is a continuous up till 2013. Also, to be noted, the rise from 
2003 to 2009 is not so steep compared to the previous years. This might be also 
interpreted as that maybe new regulation in 2004 stopped the sharp increase in β. All 
this information can be seen in figure 9.2. 
 
The last country under investigation is Australia and it has one company called Toll. 
Here the authors do not see any of the expected results. It is observed that up till 2001 
the β is decreasing, where it decreases from 1.15 in 1995 to 0.6 in 2001. Then, there is 
a continuous increase. In 2009 it is seen that it becomes even steeper. Therefore, the 
results are opposite to all 3 periods where the authors expect first an increase, then a 
decrease and then another subsequent decrease. 
 
5.3. Interpretation of the results 
 
This part of the chapter provides interpretation of the results of β considering the 
observatory points which are discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 of Chapter 4 above. 
 
	   46 
The β of Maersk is mostly rising since 1984. The rise from 1984 to 1990 is due to US 
Shipping Act of 1984 which fostered competition in the market. From 1990 to 1998 
the β was expected to decrease but we see that there is increase in that period. This 
period was supposed to have inter-firm cooperation as such as TSA was initiated and 
the competition for Maersk supposed to decrease. The reasoning of increase in 
systematic risk of this company could be due to lower CR4 concentration ratio. 
Maersk has always been a key player and falls into those 4 companies all the time. 
From 1980 to 1998, the CR4 concentration ratio has been decreasing which implies 
that the industry became less concentrated and this could imply a rise in β of Maersk 
company. After that, in 1998 OSRA came into account and this was not in favour to 
liner shipping companies. But HHI has increased during that time. Thus, due to these 
two factors, it is seen that the β starts to decrease slowly from 2008.  
 
Moreover, the regulatory environment in Europe where the European Commission’s 
Regulation 4056/86 which had granted liner carriers a block exemption from Europe’s 
competition laws allowing shipping conferences to continue on trade routes to and 
from Europe was repealed through EC Regulation 1419/2006 in September 2006, 
which came into effect on October 2008. The repeal of the antitrust exemption 
prohibits shipping companies from engaging in collective rate setting and discussing 
capacity utilization in detail, but they are allowed to continue vessel-sharing 
agreements and other “efficiency-enhancing” operational agreements.99  Although 
Maersk is one of the largest liner shipping companies in the world with an estimated 
global market share of 15.4% in 2012, the cooperative mechanism which the Japanese 
firms created after 1984, leading to the fall in β between 1990 and 1998, as depicted 
through the results of Tezuka et. al.100  could not be replicated in the European 
context. It is important to note that Japan has so far not encouraged free competition 
between shipping lines in its national jurisdiction due to the fact that large shippers 
are linked to large ocean shipping companies in Japan through the keiretsu or “group 
system” of business organization. Japanese legislators continue to favour the Japanese 
liner companies’ perspective because these companies rely more on outside trade than 
they do on trade to or from their home country. Japan as a net provider of liner 
shipping services does not wish to forego the maritime exemption as income from 
liner shipping benefits its national economy. Perhaps, Japan will be one of the last 
few countries internationally to move towards a more market-based system. 
 
Turning to the average of two Hong Kong companies, it is seen that from 2004 to 
2013, the β is somewhat flat with increase and decrease from 2007 to 2010. This 
could be due to financial crisis. Looking at companies, Orient Overseas 
(International) Limited has a β decrease till 1999 and it starts to rise. The decrease 
falls into the second period and when there was an increase in inter-firm cooperation. 
The increase could be due to new OSRA regulation. From 2009 the β is flat. This 
could be implication of global recession or increase in market concentration. China 
Shipping Container Lines Company Limited has a very similar view to the average of 
two companies and the reasoning might be the same. Also notable in this context is 
that Hong Kong’s strong tradition for laissez faire policies may explain its lack of 
competition legislation, but it appears to be evaluating the need for a competition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 “Antitrust: Commission Adopts Guidelines on Application of Competition Rules to Maritime 
Transport Services,” IP/08/1063, Brussels, 1 July 2008 available online at  
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/legislation/maritime/ 
100 See Tezuka et. al., supra note 2. 
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policy in the liner sector. Hong Kong has lost some of its market share to mainland 
Chinese ports, partly because of higher terminal handling charges that are applied 
across the board by the shipping lines calling at Hong Kong.  
 
The Taiwanese companies provide a slightly different view. By looking at the average 
of three Taiwanese companies, it is seen that the trend to decrease in the systematic 
risk has a longer period. Here it is observed that β decreases up till 2001. Then, there 
is an increase in CAPM- β and this could be due to that the effects of OSRA took 
longer time to affect Taiwanese companies. From 2004, it is seen that β starts to 
decrease. The reason would be that the market reorganised and increasing market 
concentration became main player in the systematic risk. From 2009, the β once again 
starts to increase. Like it was before, here there reason might be the effect of the 
global financial crisis which reduced international trade and hugely impacted liner 
shipping freight rates. Both Yang Ming Transport Corp and Wan Hai lines Ltd have 
similar β movements and the reasoning would be similar for the average of Taiwanese 
companies. The only difference would be that for the Wan Hai lines Ltd the β 
increases up till 1999. 
 
The decrease of β for Korean company Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd would be 
due to increased cooperation of liner shipping companies. Once again, the increase 
period starts when OSRA regulation has been accepted. Thus, there is a chance that 
the market realised the effects of it later and the increase in β starts in 2001. A change 
in trend is seen like in other countries, is once again 2008, a year when global 
recessions has started. This could be once again a reason why there is a change in 
trend of β movement of Hanjin. 
 
The systematic risk of CSAV (company from Chile) starts to increase from 2000. And 
again, the reasoning would be that the market took longer time to take in account the 
effects of OSRA. Even thought that the HHI increases, the company has a high rise in 
systematic risk. From 1994 up till 2000 the company, comparing to Maersk, did not 
have an increase. The difference is that CSAV is 10 times smaller in size compared to 
Maersk and it could be that decrease in concentration during that period had more 
effects for the bigger companies and smaller companies could use the advantages of 
cooperation. 
 
In interpreting the movement of β for freight forwarders it is observed that in the US, 
between 2000 and 2008 the cargo consolidation market shows a gradual increase in 
systematic risk. From 2008 the further increase in β may be due to the beginning of 
global recession which affected the transportation industry. From 2010 the systematic 
risk becomes stable which could be interpreted as an indication of change in 
regulation which reduced the tariff publication requirements for NVOCCs. Compared 
to liner shipping industry, consolidators have a slow increase in market concentration 
of levels. From 2005 to 2007, the concentration rate was even decreasing, and it 
decreased to 205 and increased to 258 in 2010. Compared to liner shipping industry, it 
is a very low increase, as in the liner shipping industry market concentration increased 
from 336 in 1999 to 644 in 2009. 
 
Comparing the companies based in the US individually, for all four companies the β 
was increasing from 2001. When the companies were faced with the challenges posed 
by the global financial crisis in 2008, it is observed that two of them have an increase 
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in β during that period while the other two seems not to be really affected. The 
possible reasoning could be that the HHI increased and some big players in the freight 
forwarding industry could be better positioned to serve large customers and heavy 
investments in IT could also have led to improve productivity and abilities to reflect 
on short-term market changes.101 From 2011, for three of the four companies, the β 
starts to decrease. It can be stated that this decrease is due to the relaxed tariff 
publication requirements, which has been discussed in detail earlier in this thesis. 
 
In Germany, Deutsche Post shows a really low variation indicating that the company 
used the global financial crisis in its favour. When the systematic risk for the other 
consolidators increased, it seems that DHL has taken advantage of its leading position 
and increased market concentration. However, the movements during all period are 
really small for Deutsche Post as it varies between 0.9 and 1 making clearer 
interpretations difficult. 
 
The Swiss companies seem to also have benefitted during the financial crisis. The 
systematic risk of the average of two companies started to decline in 2009. The 
reasoning would be once again, that these two companies were able to cope with the 
changed market environment. Moreover, a continuity of decrease was followed by the 
new 2010 regulation, where consolidators were able to compete in the market more 
easily. Panalpina’s systematic risk moves in the same way like the average; thus, the 
reasoning would be the same. Kuehne Nagel International Ltd also lost some 
systematic risk during the recession time. What is different is that it did not continue 
to decrease, and there was an increase from 2010 to 2012.  
 
The Danish company DSV once again had in its favour the financial crisis and that 
would be the reason why it has a declining β from 2009. Also, the company could 
take the benefits of the 2010 regulation. On the other hand, 2011 looks only a 
continuity of 2009, and it is hard to state, whether the new regulation make a big 
impact for the company. Also, market concentration increased but the β looks quite 
stable. 
 
The Australian company Toll Holdings Limited does not behave like the earlier 
discussed companies and it could be due to different location of its main market. For 
them, unlike European companies, global crisis raised the β. On the other hand, it is 
seen that from 2011 β stops to increase and becomes flat.  
 
In an attempt to provide reasoning for the behaviour of β in Australia from a legal 
perspective, it is submitted that liner conferences which are permitted under Part X of 
the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, as amended by the International Liner 
Cargo Shipping Act 2000. The interpretation is broad and covers traditional 
conferences and discussion agreements.  Shipping lines are allowed to co-operate in 
the provision of services, capacity agreements, service levels, rates and technical 
agreements. Exemptions are limited to liner shipping activities covering ocean 
transport and loading and discharging operations at cargo terminals, including inland 
cargo terminals.  As far as possible, protection available to cargo interests is extended 
to cover importers’ inward shipments. Powers are available to the Minister for 
Transport and Regional Services and the Australian Competition and Consumer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 See supra note 82. 
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Commission to respond to conduct likely to cause an unreasonable increase in freights 
and/or an unreasonable decrease in services.  No unreasonable restrictions must be 
placed on new parties seeking to join a conference. In 2005, the Australian 
Productivity Commission, an independent government agency charged with 
reviewing the economic effects of government policy, undertook a further review of 
the arrangements to determine the continuing justification of the Acts or any changes 
required to improve their effectiveness. The Commission reported in 2005 that it’s 
‘strongly preferred option is to repeal’ the ocean liner shipping exemption under 
Australian competition law. While cargo interests appear to be reasonably satisfied 
with the principles of the current system, it appears that regulators might take a less 
benign view. This situation has an effect on the cargo consolidation industry which 
will gain from any deregulatory move in this regime. 
 
It is evident from the above discussion that Australian cargo consolidators whose 
business is primarily focussed in the Asia Pacific region do not follow the global 
trend both from a regulatory and a global market perspective. The other global 
consolidators considered in this study have a much wider market reach and have been 
affected by the NSA rules to a certain extent although many of their home 
jurisdictions do not have such mechanisms as seen in the US.    
 
5.4. Robustness check using FF3F model and estimated time paths 
 
To confirm the results as described above, Fama-French 3 Factor (FF3F) model is 
used. Fama and French introduced this model through two scholarly publications.102 
This model is different, as it is not a one-factor model and it is more explanatory. 
With this model we also get OLS, GARCH (1,1) and time-varying β. This model can 
be described by the equation below: 
 𝑅!,! −   𝑅!,! =   𝛼! +   𝛽! 𝑅!,! − 𝑅!,! + 𝑠!𝑆𝑀𝐵! + ℎ!𝐻𝑀𝐿! + 𝜀!,!   
 
The difference between the log-returns on portfolios for large stocks and small stocks 
is small (market capitalization) minus big (SMB) and the difference between log-
returns on a portfolio of high and low book-to-market ratios is high (book-to-market 
ratio) minus low (HML). The data we use for SMB and HML is from a website 
regularly updated and maintained by Kenneth R. French.103 There is data for US, and 
it is used for the robustness check in the US consolidation industry. Moreover, a 
robustness check is made for DSV, a consolidators company from Denmark. Also for 
Maersk, the Danish liner shipping company and for some of the Hong Kong liner 
shipping companies a robustness check is made. For the Danish companies, European 
factors data is used. For Hong Kong companies, Asia Pacific data is used (which 
excludes Japan). All robustness check results are presented in Annex III. Firstly, it is 
possible to find tables for the liner shipping industry (also graphs of time-varying β), 
and after for the consolidation industry.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 See E. F. Fama and K. R French, "The cross section of expected stock returns", Journal of Finance, 
47, 1992, at pp. 427–465. See also E. F. Fama and K. R French, "Common factors in the returns on 
stock and bonds", Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 1993, at pp. 3–56. 
103 See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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All new βs calculated are statistically significant, and other parameters are 
insignificant. So, at looking time-varying parameters the authors only concentrate on 
β. All in all, time-varying βs are really similar to single-factor model βs. 
 
Comparing time-varying β of Maersk, (figures 11.1 and 1.2) the β rises, but not like in 
the single factor. In figure 11.1, β rises from 1992 to 2006, and in figure 1.2, there is a 
higher rise and from 2005 there is a decrease. OLS and GARCH (1,1) β results are 
higher by 0.05. In Hong Kong, time varying β is nearly the same, and similar OLS 
and GARCH (1,1) results. Looking at US consolidators, OLS is higher for C.H. 
Robinson than GARCH (1,1) in tables (6.4 and 6.5) where in tables 13.3 and 13.4 it 
can be see that there is an opposite situation. The biggest difference in time-varying β 
graphs is within UPS, where the β starts to rise from 0 in figure 6.2 and in figure 13.1 
it starts from -0.4. With RMSE β could be even -0.8. DSV also shows similar OLS 
and GARCH (1,1) results and a similar graph. In conclusion, the results pass the 
robustness check as FF3F results seem to be consistent as there are not many 
deviations from the results we have in Annex I and Annex II. 
  
	   51 
CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis focuses on the various economic and financial implications associated 
with the bargaining freedom introduced through the volume contract concept under 
the Rotterdam Rules. The experience from deregulation of the liner conference 
system initiated through service contracts in the US and its extension by providing 
service contract parity to consolidators is extrapolated to the volume contract concept 
to make a prognosis of the future landscape of the global liner shipping and cargo 
consolidation market.  
 
The thesis analyses the market environment in the global liner shipping and cargo 
consolidation industry by drawing the paths of the time-varying systematic risk, β 
from 1980–2013 for the liner shipping industry and from 1988-2013 for the cargo 
consolidation industry, depending on the data available for each company. The thesis 
identified two factors which affect β, namely, changes in regulation and market 
power. The path of β was drawn by using Kalman filter along with estimates of β with 
the market model and the FF3F model. The long-term behaviour of β was observed 
and interpreted in the penultimate chapter of the thesis.  
 
Two observatory points were established to observe the effects of market changes on 
the risk in the liner shipping and consolidation industry. For the liner industry, the 
first observatory point relates to increase in β due to changes in regulation promoting 
competition, and the second relates to decrease in β due to an increase in market 
power due to cooperation and concentration among companies. For the consolidation 
business, the first observatory point conveys a decrease in β due to the regulations 
allowing more business opportunities through forward contracting, and the second 
relates to further decrease in β due to relaxed publication requirements. 
 
This study contributes to the growing financial literature of linking the behaviour of β 
to market changes and observing the long-term behaviour of β using set observatory 
points. This study has shown that CAPM- β in financial theory is related to the 
framework of market analysis in industrial organization theory. It is also found that 
the behaviour of β is linked to market changes through the detailed literature survey. 
 
For the liner shipping industry, the results are mostly in conformity with the first 
observatory point suggesting an increasing trend in β during the period 1980-1989 
which reflects regulatory changes in the liner shipping business. However, the β 
follows a decreasing trend during the period 1990-1998 for certain markets, consistent 
with the second observatory point, suggesting that market risk was reduced through 
cooperation between liner shipping companies which entered into various market 
stabilization agreements. However, the effect of cooperation was limited to certain 
markets in Asia and European firms were largely unaffected which is obvious from 
the results of Maersk. After 1998, the β rises shortly due to the passage of OSRA and 
then flattens for most companies which may be due to offsetting of the two 
conflicting factors arising from the first and second observatory points. Also notable 
in this context is that the liner shipping industry experienced an unprecedented boom 
between 2000 and 2006 with rise of production centres in China and other parts of 
Asia feeding to the demands from the consumer markets in Europe and North 
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America. The period between 2008 to 2010 sees a rise in β for most liner shipping 
companies as this period marks the turmoil of the global financial crisis on the liner 
shipping industry as a whole which witnessed dramatic fall in freight rates.  
 
The analysis of the cargo consolidation industry did not reap consistent results across 
continents as the change in regulation through the introduction of the NSA rule in 
2004 and further relaxation in the publication requirements in the US in 2010 has not 
been propagated to other parts of the world. Moreover, the NSA rule was introduced 
during a period when the world economy was subsequently hit by a financial crisis 
which affected the liner shipping business to a considerable extent. As explained 
below, the use of service contracts cannot be fully appreciated at such a juncture of 
economic turmoil and it is submitted that a detailed study at a future occasion might 
generate more obvious results. However, some of the results of the US based 
consolidation companies are in line with the general hypothesis suggested by the 
authors.  
 
It has been repeatedly stated in this thesis that the global financial crisis has had an 
affect on the systematic risk of the companies analysed herein. It is notable in this 
context that the use of service contracts is more frequent in the time of economic 
boom rather than in time of bust. Large shippers and consolidators are encouraged to 
use service contracts when they anticipate a rise in future freight rates of liner carriers. 
Therefore, the effects of deregulation on liner shipping and cargo consolidation 
industry that can be expected during boom period is considerably different than 
during a period of economic downturn. It has to be borne in mind that while it is true 
that in most cases of carriage under a service contract a rate applies that is different 
from that for ordinary shipments, there are some good economic reasons including the 
following:  
 
(i) The service contract market, being a future market is different from the 
spot market. In a future market the expectations on future price 
increases or decreases are reflected in the actual prices. 
(ii) In the spot market sometimes ‘marginal pricing’, i.e., the price not 
covering the fixed costs, occurs. For large quantities in a future market, 
marginal pricing is unusual because pricing below costs can lead to 
insolvency of the carrier. 
(iii) Large quantities may lead to economy of scale with a corresponding 
price decreasing effect.104  
(iv) Special logistical requirements may lead to additional costs and, 
therefore, may have a price increasing effect. 
(v) The carriage of large volumes may cause fierce competition, which 
may have a price decreasing effect. 
 
All of the above mentioned factors lead to the result that the price per unit in a service 
contract will be different from an ordinary shipment on the spot market. Whether the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Long-term, larger quantities may lead to economics of scale because larger ships may result in 
lower costs per TEU. Short-term, larger quantities will increase the level of occupancy of a vessel. 
Each vessel, however, has in a certain trade an optimal occupancy level in the order of 85 – 90 per cent 
of its theoretical total capacity. When the occupancy increases beyond such optimum, the costs 
connected with shifting containers in ports during loading/unloading operations may become higher 
than the gross profit margin of the containers that are carried beyond the optimal number. 
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freight rate for shipments under a service contract will be higher or lower than for 
shipments on the spot market will depend on the combined effect of factors (i) to (v) 
above. 
 
Another relevant issue is whether service contracts are a dominant factor in the 
market. In the non-United States trades, provided shippers are free under the law or 
commercial considerations to select their carriers, it is estimated that some 50 to 70 
per cent of the total number of shipments105 are carried under the rate agreement 
system 106 . Even where volumes are large, relatively speaking not many such 
consignments are carried under volume contracts. Only when there is a scarcity of 
shipping space there is a tendency for an increase in the numbers of service contracts. 
This is because under such circumstances, certainty of space may become more 
important for shippers than it would have been otherwise.  However, under normal 
circumstances if the average occupancy level of liner ships is around 75 per cent, it is 
estimated that no more than 20 to 25 per cent of the total number of shipments would 
be carried under service contracts.107 
 
A similar experience is expected to follow in the transportation industry if and when 
the use of volume contracts becomes a reality. Therefore, the use of volume contracts 
during the time of economic boom will have a positive effect on the systematic risk of 
cargo consolidators while it might have a negative effect on the liner carriers given 
that there will be increased competition due to the deregulatory effect. The results will 
also vary depending on the market concentration of the companies. On the whole, the 
volume contract regime will result in increased benefit to the shippers involved in 
international trade and thereby benefitting the consumers who are end users of the 
commodities transported by ships. 
 
The authors recognise that the β might have been affected by other factors such as, 
fluctuations in foreign exchange rates or crude oil prices. The dynamics of world 
trade also changed during the 1990s with the emergence of China as one of the 
leading players in the manufacturing business. The impacts of these factors were not 
removed from the data. Future research may be possible in this area which can 
consider these factors. 
 
This thesis provides a methodological perspective for financial experts to analyse the 
evolution of the liner shipping industry and the growing importance of cargo 
consolidators in enhancing the efficiency though use of economy of information and 
forward contracting in the maturing liner shipping business landscape. Moreover, 
there is an emerging area called supply chain finance which will go hand in hand with 
supply chain management, where the two are considered as two sides of the same 
coin. In early 2013, the banking industry released a unique set of legal and technology 
standards to unlock the potential of the supply chain finance market. The cargo 
consolidation companies, which at present have the best view of the location of 
goods, are not used to sharing the information held with them. They have developed 
their own practices around shipment and tracking where the goods are but have not 
thought about turning this into something to trigger financial services which is a huge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 See Mukherjee & Basu Bal, supra note 18, at p. 603. 
106 “Rate agreements” here refers to cargo carried either under the agreed rates or under lower spot 
rates. 
107 See Mukherjee & Basu Bal, supra note 18, at p. 603. 
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loss to corporations involved in international trade and the banks which finance 
international trade transactions. While there is an opportunity for banks to work with 
these consolidation companies using global information systems like GPS, it would 
mean that the latter would have to change their business practices. In addition, if more 
information is available with the banks on the fluctuating value of goods while they 
are being transported, they will also have the possibility to offset collateral against 
capital turning the entire supply chain into a financial asset. It is submitted in this 
context that the role of forward contracting through use of volume contracts will 
provide more commercial certainty to both consolidators and banks in relation to 
transportation of goods which forms a part of the supply chain.  
 
The thesis also makes an attempt to facilitate legislators in understanding the 
consequences of the evolving commercial and business issues related to the liner 
shipping industry, which the Rotterdam Rules might govern if it enters into force in 
the future. A proper understanding of the commercial aspects of volume contracts will 
help governments to decide whether or not to accept the Rules taking account of their 
respective constitutional dictates. It is submitted that with the increasing role of 
consolidators in the liner shipping sector, small and medium shippers will benefit in 
the long-term from use of volume contracts.   
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THE ANNEXES 
 
ERDSB - excess log-returns of Maersk 
ERWIND – excess log-returns of FTSE Denmark 20 Index 
ERCSCL – excess log-returns of China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited 
EROROC – excess log-returns of Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
ERHNKG – excess log-returns of the Hang Seng index 
AVERAGE2 – excess log-returns of 2 Hong Kong companies 
EREVE - excess log-returns of Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan) Limited 
ERYMM - excess log-returns of Yang Ming Marine Transport Corporation 
ERWHL - excess log-returns of Wan Hai Lines Limited 
ERTAIW - excess log-returns of TAIEX 
AVERAGE3 – excess log-returns of the average three Taiwanese companies 
ERHJS – excess log-returns of Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Limited 
ERKORCOMP – excess log-returns of KOSPI 
ERVPR – excess log-returns of CSAV 
ERIGPAGEN – excess log-returns of IGPA 
EREXPD – excess log-returns of	  Expeditors International of Washington Inc. 
ERCHRW – excess log-returns of	  C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. 
ERUPS – excess log-returns of UPS 
ERUTIW – excess log-returns of	  UTi Worldwide Inc. 
AVERAGE 4 – excess log-returns of the four US companies 
ERNASDA – excess log-returns of Nasdaq Composite 
ERDPW – excess log-returns of Deutsche Post 
ERRMDAX – excess log-returns of MDAX 
ERKUHNE – excess log-returns of Kuehne Nagel International Ltd 
ERPANALP – excess log-returns of Panalpina 
ERSWISSMI – excess log-returns of Swiss Market Index 
AVERAGE2a – excess log-returns of the average of two Swiss companies 
ERDSV – excess log-returns of DSV A/S 
ERTOLX – excess log-returns of Toll Holdings Limited 
ERASX – excess log-returns of All Ordinaries 
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ANNEX – I 
 
DATA RESOURCE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
OF LINER SHIPPING COMPANIES 
 
Country 1 – Denmark 
 
AP Moeller Maersk A/S is a Denmark-based shipping and logistics company. It 
operates within such business units, as Maersk Line, which offers global container 
services; Maersk Oil, engaged in the oil and gas production and exploration activities; 
APM Terminals, which is engaged in container terminal activities and repair of 
containers, among others; Maersk Drilling, which is engaged in the offshore drilling 
activities and operation of land rigs; Maersk Supply Services, which is engaged in the 
supply vessel activities with anchor handling and platform supply vessels; Maersk 
Tankers, engaged in the tanker shipping of crude oil, oil products and gas; Damco, 
engaged in the logistics and forwarding activities; SVITZER, responsible for the 
towing and salvage activities; Dansk Supermarked Group, which operates 
supermarkets, department stores discount stores; Maersk FPSOs and Maersk LNG, 
which operates floating oil and gas production units, as well as is engaged in other 
businesses. 
 
FTSE Denmark 20 index is used. It includes largest 20 Danish listed companies. 
 
Data available between: 1983 - 2013 
 
Table 1.1 – Descriptive statistics 1983 - 2013 
 
 ERDSB ERWIND 
 Mean -0.058108 -0.060114 
 Median -0.059015 -0.055150 
 Maximum  0.346589  0.092917 
 Minimum -0.378267 -0.300985 
 Std. Dev.  0.097231  0.063947 
 Skewness  0.152595 -0.456039 
 
Figure 1.1 – Line graph of excess log-returns of Maersk and market index 
respectively 
  
 
Outliers: in Maersk 1989 01 
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Table 1.2 - OLS results for Maersk 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSB   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/22/13   Time: 18:57   
Sample (adjusted): 1983M05 2013M03  
Included observations: 359 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWIND 1.126447 0.051307 21.95497 0.0000 
C 0.008717 0.004506 1.934572 0.0538 
     
     R-squared 0.574504    Mean dependent var -0.059236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.573312    S.D. dependent var 0.094981 
S.E. of regression 0.062043    Akaike info criterion -2.716419 
Sum squared resid 1.374218    Schwarz criterion -2.694785 
Log likelihood 489.5972    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.707816 
F-statistic 482.0207    Durbin-Watson stat 2.215808 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 1.3 - GARCH (1,1) results for Maersk 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSB   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/22/13   Time: 18:58   
Sample (adjusted): 1983M05 2013M03  
Included observations: 359 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 14 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWIND 1.101974 0.048926 22.52351 0.0000 
C 0.008022 0.004099 1.957085 0.0503 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000174 7.92E-05 2.194383 0.0282 
RESID(-1)^2 0.120201 0.043058 2.791639 0.0052 
GARCH(-1) 0.834654 0.052568 15.87754 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.574165    Mean dependent var -0.059236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.572972    S.D. dependent var 0.094981 
S.E. of regression 0.062068    Akaike info criterion -2.838517 
Sum squared resid 1.375313    Schwarz criterion -2.784432 
Log likelihood 514.5138    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.817010 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.223866    
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Figure 1.2 – Time-varying β of Maersk 
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Country 2 - Hong Kong 
 
Data available between: 1996 - 2013 
 
China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited is principally engaged in 
operation and management of container shipping. The Company is also involved in 
the provision of port services. The Company operates Pacific lines, 
Europe/Mediterranean lines, Asia-Pacific lines and China domestic lines, among 
others. During the year ended December 31, 2011, the Company handled 
approximately 7,438,002 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). The Company operates 
its businesses in domestic and overseas markets. 
 
Data available between: 2004 - 2013 
 
Orient Overseas (International) Limited is an investment holding company. 
Through its subsidiaries, the Company engages in the provision of container transport 
and logistics services. Its container transport and logistics include global 
containerized shipping services in trade lanes, covering Trans-Pacific, Trans-Atlantic, 
Asia/Europe, Asia/Australia and Intra-Asia trades, and integrated services over the 
management and control of storage and flow of goods. As of December 31, 2011, the 
Company owned 45 vessels after sold four vessels. The Company's subsidiaries 
include Cargo System Warehouse and Transport Ltd., Consolidated Leasing & 
Terminals, Inc., Containers No. 1 Inc., Containers No. 2 Inc., Dongguan Orient 
Container Co. Ltd., Far Gain Investment Ltd., Glory Top Investment Ltd., Hai Dong 
Transportation Co. Ltd. and Kenwake Ltd., among others. 
 
Data available between: 1996 - 2013 
 
The Hang Seng Index is used which is the main index of Hong Kong stock market. It 
has 48 largest companies and it has about 60% of capitalisation of the whole Stock 
Exchange. 
 
Data available between: 1996 – 2013 
 
Table 2.1 - Descriptive statistics depending on availability of data 
 
 ERCSCL EROROC AVERAGE2 ERHNKG 
 Mean -0.027908 -0.020607 -0.024257 -0.023667 
 Median -0.013959 -0.014503 -0.013366 -0.022071 
 Maximum  0.446094  0.364404  0.368782  0.168005 
 Minimum -0.555867 -0.360825 -0.392448 -0.252454 
 Std. Dev.  0.176022  0.152962  0.150771  0.068224 
 Skewness -0.122419  0.129169 -0.123099 -0.349741 
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Figure 2.1 – line graph of excess log-return for Orient Overseas (International) 
Limited, market index, China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited and 
the average of two companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: no outliers for Orient Overseas (International) Limited, 1 outlier in 1997 11 
for market index, 1 outlier in 2011 10 for China Shipping Container Lines Company 
Limited and no outliers in the average of two companies 
 
 
Table 2.2 – OLS results for Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EROROC   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/13   Time: 20:54   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M11 2013M03  
Included observations: 197 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 0.673863 0.126023 5.347150 0.0000 
C -0.004773 0.010975 -0.434893 0.6641 
     
     R-squared 0.127876    Mean dependent var -0.032511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.123403    S.D. dependent var 0.144993 
S.E. of regression 0.135752    Akaike info criterion -1.145874 
Sum squared resid 3.593577    Schwarz criterion -1.112542 
Log likelihood 114.8686    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.132381 
F-statistic 28.59201    Durbin-Watson stat 1.933970 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 2.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
 
 
Dependent Variable: EROROC   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/24/13   Time: 20:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M11 2013M03  
Included observations: 197 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 64 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 0.627094 0.120295 5.212968 0.0000 
C -0.007083 0.011848 -0.597864 0.5499 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.002346 0.001868 1.255513 0.2093 
RESID(-1)^2 0.077913 0.052053 1.496808 0.1344 
GARCH(-1) 0.795887 0.142297 5.593135 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.127253    Mean dependent var -0.032511 
Adjusted R-squared 0.122777    S.D. dependent var 0.144993 
S.E. of regression 0.135800    Akaike info criterion -1.143400 
Sum squared resid 3.596145    Schwarz criterion -1.060069 
Log likelihood 117.6249    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.109667 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.922165    
     
      
 
Table 2.4 – OLS results for China Shipping Container Lines Company Limited 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCSCL   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:52   
Sample (adjusted): 2004M08 2013M03  
Included observations: 104 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 1.773962 0.183494 9.667703 0.0000 
C 0.015878 0.012677 1.252545 0.2132 
     
     R-squared 0.478166    Mean dependent var -0.022832 
Adjusted R-squared 0.473050    S.D. dependent var 0.168975 
S.E. of regression 0.122661    Akaike info criterion -1.339744 
Sum squared resid 1.534659    Schwarz criterion -1.288890 
Log likelihood 71.66668    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.319141 
F-statistic 93.46449    Durbin-Watson stat 1.840512 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 2.5 – GARCH (1,1) results for China Shipping Container Lines Company 
Limited 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCSCL   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:52   
Sample (adjusted): 2004M08 2013M03  
Included observations: 104 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 15 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 1.651191 0.216487 7.627213 0.0000 
C 0.012077 0.012977 0.930617 0.3521 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.001286 0.001340 0.959750 0.3372 
RESID(-1)^2 0.072011 0.077867 0.924794 0.3551 
GARCH(-1) 0.847758 0.142156 5.963590 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.475831    Mean dependent var -0.022832 
Adjusted R-squared 0.470692    S.D. dependent var 0.168975 
S.E. of regression 0.122935    Akaike info criterion -1.336281 
Sum squared resid 1.541526    Schwarz criterion -1.209147 
Log likelihood 74.48662    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.284775 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.810890    
     
      
Table 2.6 – OLS results for average 2 
 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/24/13   Time: 21:08   
Sample (adjusted): 2004M08 2013M03  
Included observations: 104 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 1.469978 0.166375 8.835325 0.0000 
C 0.011360 0.011494 0.988288 0.3254 
     
     R-squared 0.433532    Mean dependent var -0.020717 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427978    S.D. dependent var 0.147051 
S.E. of regression 0.111218    Akaike info criterion -1.535614 
Sum squared resid 1.261672    Schwarz criterion -1.484761 
Log likelihood 81.85194    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.515012 
F-statistic 78.06297    Durbin-Watson stat 1.902194 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 2.7 – GARCH (1,1) results Average 2 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE2   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/24/13   Time: 21:09   
Sample (adjusted): 2004M08 2013M03  
Included observations: 104 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 9 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 1.505586 0.175603 8.573813 0.0000 
C 0.014729 0.013391 1.099982 0.2713 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.011305 0.010744 1.052195 0.2927 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.121588 0.024247 -5.014437 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) 0.222288 0.854136 0.260249 0.7947 
     
     R-squared 0.432963    Mean dependent var -0.020717 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427404    S.D. dependent var 0.147051 
S.E. of regression 0.111273    Akaike info criterion -1.524873 
Sum squared resid 1.262938    Schwarz criterion -1.397739 
Log likelihood 84.29341    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.473367 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.909817    
     
      
Figure 2.2 - Time-varying β of Orient Overseas (International) Limited, China 
Shipping Container Lines Company Limited and average of 2 
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Country 3 – Taiwan 
 
Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan) Ltd. is principally engaged in the international 
marine transportation services. The Company operates marine lines, including across 
the Pacific, Far East to Europe/Mediterranean, Far East to South Africa/East Coast of 
South Africa, East Africa, as well as along Asian coast, among others. The Company 
is also involved in the leasing of cabins, the provision of agent services and others. On 
December 31, 2012, the Company finished the merger of its two wholly owned 
subsidiaries, Clove Holding Ltd. (Clove) and Ample Holding Ltd. (Ample), with 
Clove to survive and Ample to be dissolved. 
 
Data available between: 1995 - 2013 
 
Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. is a Taiwan-based company principally 
engaged in shipping industry. The Company operates its businesses primarily through 
the provision of marine cargo transportation services, ship leasing, as well as agent 
operation of ships, among others. As of December 31, 2011, the Company operated 
87 ships, including 85 bulk goods cargos and two coal carriers. The Company 
operates various ship routes, such as Asia-America, North America-South America, 
North America-Northwest Europe, Asia-Northwest Europe, Asia-Mediterranean, 
Asia-Black Sea, as well as intra-Asia, among others. 
 
Data available between: 1995 - 2013 
 
Wan Hai Lines Ltd. is principally engaged in the international marine transportation 
industry. The Company operates its businesses through shipping business, shipping 
agency services, the operation of port container stations, as well as the leasing and 
sale of ships and containers. The Company provides full-container shipping services, 
covering the ports of Mainland China, Taiwan, Kanto and Kansai of Japan, South 
Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Vietnam, 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran, the Middle East, the United States, Netherlands, 
Belgium, Germany, Romania, Ukraine and Turkey, among others. The Company also 
involves in the general agency services of cargo transportation of a Norway car-
carrier company in Taiwan. 
 
Data available between: 1996 - 2013 
 
Taiwan Capitalization Weighted Stock Index (TAIEX) includes all listed stocks 
(excluding newly listed stocks and preferred stocks) in Taiwan Stock Exchange 
(TWSE). 
 
Table 3.1 – Descriptive statistics depending on availability of data 
 
 EREVE ERYMM ERWHL ERTAIW AVERAGE3 
 Mean -0.033202 -0.033664 -0.030567 -0.030506 -0.032478 
 Median -0.039604 -0.043688 -0.035505 -0.022340 -0.039263 
 Maximum  0.382630  0.395915  0.306017  0.169333  0.322991 
 Minimum -0.515417 -0.359154 -0.408014 -0.261824 -0.344585 
 Std. Dev.  0.126506  0.126748  0.099456  0.077750  0.105678 
 Skewness  0.260889  0.465986 -0.112138 -0.274542  0.249888 
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Figure 3.1 - line graph of excess log-return for Evergreen Marine Corp. 
(Taiwan) Ltd, Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp, index of Taiwan market, 
Wan Hai Lines Ltd and average of 3 companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  
	  	  
 
Outliers: one outlier in 2001 10 for Evergreen Marine Corp, no outliers for Yang 
Ming Marine Transport Corp, no outliers for Taiwan market, two outliers in 2000 09 
and 2002 02 for Wan Hai Lines Ltd, one outlier in 2003 01 in the average of 3 
companies 
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Table 3.2 – OLS results for Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan) Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: EREVE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:29   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 217 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.879086 0.086293 10.18726 0.0000 
C -0.004314 0.007247 -0.595259 0.5523 
     
     R-squared 0.325554    Mean dependent var -0.033200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322417    S.D. dependent var 0.119352 
S.E. of regression 0.098245    Akaike info criterion -1.793528 
Sum squared resid 2.075204    Schwarz criterion -1.762377 
Log likelihood 196.5978    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.780944 
F-statistic 103.7802    Durbin-Watson stat 2.105355 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 3.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan) Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: EREVE   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:30   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 217 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 27 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.861079 0.075157 11.45701 0.0000 
C -0.004870 0.007462 -0.652689 0.5140 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000553 0.000506 1.092936 0.2744 
RESID(-1)^2 0.049140 0.030379 1.617577 0.1058 
GARCH(-1) 0.894373 0.078741 11.35840 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.325417    Mean dependent var -0.033200 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322280    S.D. dependent var 0.119352 
S.E. of regression 0.098255    Akaike info criterion -1.810858 
Sum squared resid 2.075625    Schwarz criterion -1.732981 
Log likelihood 201.4781    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.779399 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.107428    
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Table 3.4 – OLS results for Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp 
 
Dependent Variable: ERYMM   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:32   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 217 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.924408 0.090450 10.22009 0.0000 
C -0.005030 0.007596 -0.662197 0.5086 
     
     R-squared 0.326969    Mean dependent var -0.035405 
Adjusted R-squared 0.323838    S.D. dependent var 0.125234 
S.E. of regression 0.102978    Akaike info criterion -1.699423 
Sum squared resid 2.279975    Schwarz criterion -1.668272 
Log likelihood 186.3874    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.686839 
F-statistic 104.4502    Durbin-Watson stat 2.031827 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      	  
Table 3.5 – GARCH (1,1) results for Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp 
 
Dependent Variable: ERYMM   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:32   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 217 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 26 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.972706 0.082349 11.81206 0.0000 
C -0.004937 0.008302 -0.594679 0.5521 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000356 0.000274 1.300985 0.1933 
RESID(-1)^2 0.005577 0.012038 0.463317 0.6431 
GARCH(-1) 0.963837 0.027491 35.06013 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.325933    Mean dependent var -0.035405 
Adjusted R-squared 0.322798    S.D. dependent var 0.125234 
S.E. of regression 0.103058    Akaike info criterion -1.705124 
Sum squared resid 2.283483    Schwarz criterion -1.627246 
Log likelihood 190.0059    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.673665 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.035111    
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Table 3.6 – OLS results for Wan Hai Lines Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERWHL   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M07 2012M11  
Included observations: 197 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.639703 0.073247 8.733538 0.0000 
C -0.010668 0.005992 -1.780346 0.0766 
     
     R-squared 0.281171    Mean dependent var -0.029365 
Adjusted R-squared 0.277485    S.D. dependent var 0.092415 
S.E. of regression 0.078553    Akaike info criterion -2.239980 
Sum squared resid 1.203269    Schwarz criterion -2.206648 
Log likelihood 222.6381    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.226487 
F-statistic 76.27468    Durbin-Watson stat 2.171694 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      	  
Table 3.7 – GARCH (1,1) results for Wan Hai Lines Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERWHL   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:38   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M07 2012M11  
Included observations: 197 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.781808 0.073710 10.60661 0.0000 
C -0.009963 0.006188 -1.610055 0.1074 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.002300 0.001473 1.561775 0.1183 
RESID(-1)^2 0.258940 0.112382 2.304103 0.0212 
GARCH(-1) 0.387193 0.304129 1.273120 0.2030 
     
     R-squared 0.265897    Mean dependent var -0.029365 
Adjusted R-squared 0.262132    S.D. dependent var 0.092415 
S.E. of regression 0.079383    Akaike info criterion -2.243189 
Sum squared resid 1.228837    Schwarz criterion -2.159859 
Log likelihood 225.9541    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.209457 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.115813    
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Table 3.8 – OLS results for average of 3 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE3   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/02/13   Time: 18:33   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M07 2013M01  
Included observations: 199 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.862738 0.071242 12.10995 0.0000 
C -0.008117 0.005942 -1.366147 0.1735 
     
     R-squared 0.426744    Mean dependent var -0.034264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.423834    S.D. dependent var 0.102874 
S.E. of regression 0.078087    Akaike info criterion -2.251993 
Sum squared resid 1.201216    Schwarz criterion -2.218895 
Log likelihood 226.0733    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.238597 
F-statistic 146.6509    Durbin-Watson stat 2.039542 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Table 3.9 – GARCH (1,1) results for average of 3 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE3   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/02/13   Time: 18:34   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M07 2013M01  
Included observations: 199 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 22 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERTAIW 0.903912 0.068222 13.24952 0.0000 
C -0.007186 0.006059 -1.185930 0.2356 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000502 0.000453 1.108305 0.2677 
RESID(-1)^2 0.059494 0.043769 1.359273 0.1741 
GARCH(-1) 0.857744 0.104449 8.212109 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.425762    Mean dependent var -0.034264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.422847    S.D. dependent var 0.102874 
S.E. of regression 0.078154    Akaike info criterion -2.266903 
Sum squared resid 1.203272    Schwarz criterion -2.184157 
Log likelihood 230.5569    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.233414 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.027426    
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Figure 3.2 - Time-varying β of Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp, Wan Hai 
Lines Ltd, and average 3 (note – could not get for Evergreen Marine Corp. 
(Taiwan) Ltd) 
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Coutry 4 – Korea 
 
Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd. is a Korea-based holding company engaged in 
the management of its subsidiaries. As of December 31, 2011, the Company had two 
subsidiaries: HANJIN SHIPPING CO., LTD., engaged in marine transportation 
business, as well as CyberLogitec Co.,Ltd., engaged in information technology (IT) 
business, providing IT services and solutions for marine transportation and logistics. 
 
Data available between: 1995 – 2013 
 
The Korea Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) is the main index of Korea Stock 
Exchange and it has all listed stocks. 
 
Table 4.1 – Descriptive statistics 1995 - 2013 
 
 ERHJS ERKORCOMP 
 Mean -0.070681 -0.061469 
 Median -0.065028 -0.047105 
 Maximum  0.437375  0.217948 
 Minimum -0.722023 -0.413044 
 Std. Dev.  0.178170  0.098531 
 Skewness -0.253458 -0.439495 
 	  
Figure 4.1 – Line graph of excess log-returns of Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co., 
Ltd and Korean market index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: 1 outlier in 1997 12 for Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co., Ltd and no outliers 
for Korean market index 
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Table 4.2 – OLS results for Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERHJS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:16   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M05 2013M02  
Included observations: 214 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERKORCOMP 1.212530 0.091869 13.19843 0.0000 
C 0.004903 0.010356 0.473413 0.6364 
     
     R-squared 0.451059    Mean dependent var -0.067638 
Adjusted R-squared 0.448470    S.D. dependent var 0.172894 
S.E. of regression 0.128400    Akaike info criterion -1.258030 
Sum squared resid 3.495155    Schwarz criterion -1.226572 
Log likelihood 136.6092    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.245318 
F-statistic 174.1984    Durbin-Watson stat 2.147685 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     	  
Table 4.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERHJS   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 12:16   
Sample (adjusted): 1995M05 2013M02  
Included observations: 214 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 10 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERKORCOMP 1.262525 0.085697 14.73242 0.0000 
C 0.005813 0.009976 0.582719 0.5601 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.001442 0.001460 0.988276 0.3230 
RESID(-1)^2 0.050879 0.040046 1.270509 0.2039 
GARCH(-1) 0.863105 0.112321 7.684278 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.450147    Mean dependent var -0.067638 
Adjusted R-squared 0.447553    S.D. dependent var 0.172894 
S.E. of regression 0.128507    Akaike info criterion -1.250773 
Sum squared resid 3.500963    Schwarz criterion -1.172129 
Log likelihood 138.8327    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.218994 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.142361    
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Figure 4.2 – Time-varying β of Hanjin Shipping Holdings Co. Ltd 
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Country 5 – Chile 
 
Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA (CSAV) is a Chile-based holding 
company engaged in the maritime transport, shipping and freight and cargo services. 
The Company's activities are structured in two business segments, maritime freight 
transport and freight and vessel maritime services. Maritime freight transport is 
engaged in the transport of freight containers and on a minor scale, bulk transport and 
cars. Freight and vessel maritime services is engaged in the port services of loading 
and unloading, terminal concessions, tug boat services, warehouse services and 
container dockyard, among others. As of December 31, 2011, the Company's major 
shareholder was Maritima de Inversiones SA whith 20.63% of its interest. In addition, 
its investment portfolio included 13 fully consolidated subsidiaries, such as 
Inversiones Plan Futuro SA, Norgistics Holding SA and CSAV Agency LLC, among 
others. 
 
The General Stock Price Index (IGPA) is a market capitalisation-weighted index 
contains most of the listed stocks. 
 
Data available between: 1994 - 2013 
 
Table 5.1 – Descriptive statistics 1994 - 2013 
 
 ERVPR ERIGPAGEN 
 Mean -0.045372 -0.037136 
 Median -0.046634 -0.037216 
 Maximum  0.393150  0.133910 
 Minimum -0.682597 -0.302337 
 Std. Dev.  0.113178  0.051635 
 Skewness -0.037984 -0.506418 
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Line graph of excess log-returns of CSAV and market index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: 1outlier in 2011 10 for CSAV and 1 outlier in 1998 09 for market index 
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Table 5.2 – OLS results for CSAV 
 
Dependent Variable: ERVPR   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/22/13   Time: 18:26   
Sample (adjusted): 1994M08 2013M01  
Included observations: 222 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERIGPAGEN 1.125539 0.125967 8.935202 0.0000 
C -0.002235 0.007529 -0.296874 0.7668 
     
     R-squared 0.266270    Mean dependent var -0.042178 
Adjusted R-squared 0.262935    S.D. dependent var 0.105139 
S.E. of regression 0.090264    Akaike info criterion -1.963186 
Sum squared resid 1.792472    Schwarz criterion -1.932532 
Log likelihood 219.9137    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.950810 
F-statistic 79.83783    Durbin-Watson stat 1.881543 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 5.2 – GARCH (1,1) results for CSAV 
 
Dependent Variable: ERVPR   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/22/13   Time: 18:26   
Sample (adjusted): 1994M08 2013M01  
Included observations: 222 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERIGPAGEN 1.092639 0.125418 8.711987 0.0000 
C -0.004461 0.007027 -0.634832 0.5255 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.004579 0.003463 1.322138 0.1861 
RESID(-1)^2 0.082668 0.037049 2.231290 0.0257 
GARCH(-1) 0.350713 0.456237 0.768708 0.4421 
     
     R-squared 0.265941    Mean dependent var -0.042178 
Adjusted R-squared 0.262604    S.D. dependent var 0.105139 
S.E. of regression 0.090284    Akaike info criterion -1.950126 
Sum squared resid 1.793277    Schwarz criterion -1.873489 
Log likelihood 221.4640    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.919185 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.878605    
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Figure 5.2 – Time-varying β of CSAV 
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ANNEX – II 
 
DATA RESOURCE AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
OF GLOBAL CARGO CONSOLIDATOR COMPANIES 
 
Country 1 – US 
 
Expeditors International of Washington Inc. is engaged in the business of 
providing global logistics services. The Company offers its customers an international 
network supporting the movement and positioning of goods. The Company's services 
include the consolidation or forwarding of air and ocean freight. In each United States 
office, and in many overseas offices, the Company acts as a customs broker. The 
Company also provides additional services, including distribution management, 
vendor consolidation, cargo insurance, purchase order management and customized 
logistics information. 
Data available between: 1984 - 2013 
 
UTi Worldwide Inc. is a holding company. The Company is an international, non-
asset-based supply chain services and solutions company, which provides services 
through a network of offices and contract logistics centers. As of January 31, 2012, 
the Company operated a global network of freight forwarding offices and contract 
logistics and distribution centers in a total of 59 countries. In addition, it serves its 
clients in 83 additional countries through independent agent-owned offices. The 
Company operates in two segments: Freight Forwarding, and Contract Logistics and 
Distribution. The Freight Forwarding segment includes airfreight forwarding, ocean 
freight forwarding, customs brokerage and other related services. The Contract 
Logistics and Distribution segment includes all operations providing contract 
logistics, distribution and other related services. Effective October 31, 2011, the 
Company completed the acquisition of UTi Logistics Israel, Ltd. (UTi Israel). 
Data available between: 2000 - 2013 
 
C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc. (C.H. Robinson) is a third party logistics company. 
The Company provides freight transportation services and logistics solutions to 
companies of all sizes, in a variety of industries. It operates through a network of 235 
offices, in North America, Europe, Asia, South America, Australia, and the Middle 
East. As a part of its transportation services, it provides a range of value-added 
logistics services, such as freight consolidation, supply chain consulting and analysis, 
optimization, and reporting. In addition to transportation and logistics services, it 
offers two other services: sourcing services and fee-based information services. The 
Sourcing business is primarily the buying, selling, and marketing of fresh produce. In 
October 2012, the Company sold its payment services business, T-Chek Systems, Inc. 
to Electronic Funds Source, LLC. In November 2012, the Company finalized the 
acquisition of Phoenix International, Inc. 
Data available between: 1997 - 2013 
 
United Parcel Service Inc. (UPS) is a package delivery company that operates in the 
United States less-than-truckload industry, and the provider of global supply chain 
management solutions. The Company delivers packages each business day for 1.1 
million shipping customers to 7.7 million consignees in over 220 countries and 
territories. During the year ended December 31, 2011, UPS delivered an average of 
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15.8 million pieces per day worldwide, or a total of 4.01 billion packages. Total 
revenue in 2011 was $53.1 billion. It serves the global market for logistics services, 
which include transportation, distribution, forwarding, ground, ocean and air freight, 
brokerage and financing. It operates in three segments: U.S. Domestic Package, 
International Package and Supply Chain & Freight. In February 2012, it acquired 
Kiala S.A. In February 2011, the Company announced the expansion of its UPS 
Express Freight service into Israel and Slovakia. In December 2011, it acquired Pieffe 
Group. 
Data available between: 1999 - 2013 
 
The Nasdaq Composite is a stock market index which contains not only common 
stocks but also similar securities which are listed in NASDAQ stock market and has 
over 3000 components. As consolidators are service companies involved with newest 
technologies and their businesses are around the world, this index has been chosen as 
it is not exclusively US index and is highly followed by technology and growth 
companies. 
 
Table 6.1 – Descriptive statistics depending on availability of data 
 
 EREXPD ERCHRW ERUPS ERUTIW AVERAGE4 ERNASDA 
 Mean -0.037491 -0.035578 -0.042770 -0.038894 -0.038683 -0.043638 
 Median -0.034131 -0.030870 -0.042449 -0.028986 -0.031500 -0.037772 
 Maximum  0.183241  0.202531  0.213514  0.388808  0.145851  0.136435 
 Minimum -0.413277 -0.257247 -0.300918 -0.375928 -0.266133 -0.297484 
 Std. Dev.  0.087495  0.080856  0.060550  0.112448  0.068280  0.072504 
 Skewness -0.538882 -0.157217 -0.485632 -0.060958 -0.449753 -0.679191 
 
Figure 6.1 – Line graph of returns excess log-returns of Expeditors International 
of Washington, market index, C.H. Robinson, UPS, UTi Worldwide Inc and the 
average of 4 companies 
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Outliers: 1 outliers in 1990 08 for Expeditors International of Washington, 1 outliers 
in 1987 11 for market index, 2 outliers in 2000 04 and 2000 05 for C.H. Robinson, 2 
outliers in 2009 02 and 2009 04 for UPS, 2 outliers in 2008 11 and 2009 01 for UTi 
Worldwide Inc, 2 outliers in 2006 08 and 2009 02 for the average of 4 companies	  
 
Table 6.2 – OLS results for Expeditors International of Washington	  
 
Dependent Variable: EREXPD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:48   
Sample (adjusted): 1984M11 2013M01  
Included observations: 339 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.688501 0.066948 10.28407 0.0000 
C -0.007986 0.005745 -1.389971 0.1655 
     
     R-squared 0.238869    Mean dependent var -0.044840 
Adjusted R-squared 0.236610    S.D. dependent var 0.094627 
S.E. of regression 0.082678    Akaike info criterion -2.141843 
Sum squared resid 2.303616    Schwarz criterion -2.119271 
Log likelihood 365.0425    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.132848 
F-statistic 105.7622    Durbin-Watson stat 2.203904 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Expeditors International of Washington 
 
Dependent Variable: EREXPD   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1984M11 2013M01  
Included observations: 339 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 11 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.619791 0.042186 14.69170 0.0000 
C -0.008513 0.006009 -1.416726 0.1566 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.005776 0.002716 2.126518 0.0335 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.060449 0.005917 -10.21562 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) 0.234816 0.399962 0.587095 0.5571 
     
     R-squared 0.235378    Mean dependent var -0.044840 
Adjusted R-squared 0.233109    S.D. dependent var 0.094627 
S.E. of regression 0.082867    Akaike info criterion -2.123119 
Sum squared resid 2.314182    Schwarz criterion -2.066688 
Log likelihood 364.8686    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.100631 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.200068    
     
      
 
Table 6.4 – OLS results for C.H. Robinson 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCHRW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:59   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M12 2013M01  
Included observations: 182 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.408302 0.080497 5.072264 0.0000 
C -0.017535 0.007281 -2.408474 0.0170 
     
     R-squared 0.125058    Mean dependent var -0.035487 
Adjusted R-squared 0.120197    S.D. dependent var 0.091510 
S.E. of regression 0.085835    Akaike info criterion -2.061856 
Sum squared resid 1.326171    Schwarz criterion -2.026647 
Log likelihood 189.6289    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.047583 
F-statistic 25.72786    Durbin-Watson stat 2.576294 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Table 6.5 – OLS results for C.H. Robinson 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCHRW   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:59   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M12 2013M01  
Included observations: 182 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.370840 0.079696 4.653187 0.0000 
C -0.022217 0.005636 -3.941713 0.0001 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.002834 0.000845 3.354438 0.0008 
RESID(-1)^2 0.350606 0.115680 3.030824 0.0024 
GARCH(-1) 0.278523 0.120976 2.302297 0.0213 
     
     R-squared 0.122899    Mean dependent var -0.035487 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118026    S.D. dependent var 0.091510 
S.E. of regression 0.085941    Akaike info criterion -2.145472 
Sum squared resid 1.329443    Schwarz criterion -2.057450 
Log likelihood 200.2379    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.109789 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.578229    
     
      
 
Table 6.6 – OLS results for UPS 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUPS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 17:11   
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 157 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.268211 0.051864 5.171469 0.0000 
C -0.032063 0.004756 -6.741861 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.147152    Mean dependent var -0.044753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.141650    S.D. dependent var 0.055095 
S.E. of regression 0.051044    Akaike info criterion -3.099614 
Sum squared resid 0.403845    Schwarz criterion -3.060681 
Log likelihood 245.3197    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.083802 
F-statistic 26.74409    Durbin-Watson stat 2.125272 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Table 6.7 – GARCH (1,1) results for UPS 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUPS   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 17:12   
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 157 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.375539 0.041597 9.027982 0.0000 
C -0.025499 0.004655 -5.477499 0.0000 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000297 0.000114 2.608206 0.0091 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.038753 0.017762 -2.181827 0.0291 
GARCH(-1) 0.885476 0.052702 16.80165 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.122858    Mean dependent var -0.044753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.117199    S.D. dependent var 0.055095 
S.E. of regression 0.051766    Akaike info criterion -3.222931 
Sum squared resid 0.415349    Schwarz criterion -3.125599 
Log likelihood 258.0001    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.183401 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.123470    
     
      
 
Table 6.8 – OLS results for UTi Worldwide Inc 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUTIW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 17:16   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.568633 0.113255 5.020830 0.0000 
C -0.014905 0.009358 -1.592841 0.1134 
     
     R-squared 0.149866    Mean dependent var -0.039520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.143921    S.D. dependent var 0.103734 
S.E. of regression 0.095979    Akaike info criterion -1.835677 
Sum squared resid 1.317312    Schwarz criterion -1.794619 
Log likelihood 135.0866    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.818994 
F-statistic 25.20873    Durbin-Watson stat 2.324107 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
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Table 6.9 – GARCH (1,1) results for UTi Worldwide Inc 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUTIW   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 17:17   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 18 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.904279 0.131881 6.856769 0.0000 
C -0.003545 0.009497 -0.373233 0.7090 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000400 0.000242 1.654988 0.0979 
RESID(-1)^2 0.049137 0.053582 0.917037 0.3591 
GARCH(-1) 0.884698 0.069505 12.72856 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.096710    Mean dependent var -0.039520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090394    S.D. dependent var 0.103734 
S.E. of regression 0.098934    Akaike info criterion -1.903751 
Sum squared resid 1.399678    Schwarz criterion -1.801105 
Log likelihood 143.0220    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.862043 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.431754    
     
      
 
Table 6.10 – OLS results for the average of 4 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE4   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:22   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.516689 0.058612 8.815466 0.0000 
C -0.013425 0.004932 -2.722180 0.0073 
     
     R-squared 0.352098    Mean dependent var -0.035558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.347567    S.D. dependent var 0.063279 
S.E. of regression 0.051113    Akaike info criterion -3.095872 
Sum squared resid 0.373588    Schwarz criterion -3.054814 
Log likelihood 226.4507    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.079189 
F-statistic 77.71244    Durbin-Watson stat 2.332831 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 6.11 – GARCH (1,1) results for the average of 4 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE4   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:22   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 73 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.643814 0.070263 9.162890 0.0000 
C -0.008831 0.004932 -1.790597 0.0734 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000192 0.000103 1.864772 0.0622 
RESID(-1)^2 0.009763 0.034704 0.281315 0.7785 
GARCH(-1) 0.897213 0.058120 15.43713 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.330601    Mean dependent var -0.035558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.325920    S.D. dependent var 0.063279 
S.E. of regression 0.051954    Akaike info criterion -3.113321 
Sum squared resid 0.385983    Schwarz criterion -3.010675 
Log likelihood 230.7158    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.071613 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.331880    
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Figure 6.2 – Time-varying β of Expeditors, CHRW, UPS, UTi Worldwide Inc 
and the average of 4 companies 
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Country 2 – Germany 
 
Deutsche Post AG is a Germany-based logistics services provider. The Company 
operates four main business divisions: Mail; Express; Global Forwarding, Freight, 
and Supply Chain. The Mail business division comprises the transport and delivery of 
written communications and serves as an end-to-end service provider for the 
management of written communications. The Express business division offers 
international and domestic courier and express services to business and private 
customers. The Global Forwarding, Freight business division comprises the 
transportation of goods by rail, road, air and sea. The Supply Chain business division 
is engaged in contract logistics and provides warehousing and transport services, as 
well as services along the entire supply chain in the different sectors. The Company 
diversifies its activities into geographical areas, including Germany, rest of Europe, 
the Americas, Asia Pacific and Other regions. 
 
Data available between: 2001 – 2013 
 
The MDAX is a stock index which has 50 Prime Standard shares and is calculated by 
Deutsche Börse. 
 
Table 7.1 – Descriptive statistics 2001 – 2013 
 
 ERDPW ERRMDAX 
 Mean -0.037451 -0.028554 
 Median -0.034778 -0.020480 
 Maximum  0.172592  0.171546 
 Minimum -0.465845 -0.267273 
 Std. Dev.  0.093697  0.064601 
 Skewness -0.948271 -0.689700 
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Graph line of excess log-returns of Deutsche Post and market index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: 1 outlier in 2008 11 for Deutsche Post and 2 outliers in 2008 10 and 2009 05 
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Table 7.2 – OLS results for Deutsche Post 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDPW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 18:10   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M03  
Included observations: 147 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERRMDAX 1.057200 0.082461 12.82058 0.0000 
C -0.007264 0.005808 -1.250821 0.2130 
     
     R-squared 0.531302    Mean dependent var -0.037451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.528069    S.D. dependent var 0.093697 
S.E. of regression 0.064367    Akaike info criterion -2.634908 
Sum squared resid 0.600758    Schwarz criterion -2.594221 
Log likelihood 195.6657    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.618376 
F-statistic 164.3674    Durbin-Watson stat 2.567408 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 7.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Deutsche Post 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDPW   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 18:11   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M03  
Included observations: 147 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 27 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERRMDAX 1.036552 0.057400 18.05843 0.0000 
C -0.006860 0.005540 -1.238197 0.2156 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000412 0.000416 0.989873 0.3222 
RESID(-1)^2 0.129390 0.065107 1.987350 0.0469 
GARCH(-1) 0.768638 0.139309 5.517496 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.530986    Mean dependent var -0.037451 
Adjusted R-squared 0.527751    S.D. dependent var 0.093697 
S.E. of regression 0.064389    Akaike info criterion -2.698106 
Sum squared resid 0.601163    Schwarz criterion -2.596390 
Log likelihood 203.3108    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.656778 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.564130    
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Figure 7.2 – Time-varying β of Deutsche Post 
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Country 3 – Switzerland 
 
Kuehne Nagel International Ltd is a Switzerland-based holding company and 
transport and logistics operator. The Company is divided into six operating segments: 
Seafreight; Airfreight; Road & Rail Logistics; Contract Logistics; Real Estate, and 
Insurance Brokers. Furthermore, the Company diversifies its activities into four 
geographical regions: Europe; Americas; Asia-Pacific, and Middle East, Central Asia 
and Africa. Within the Seafreight, Airfreight and Road & Rail Logistics operating 
segments, the Company's group is engaged in transportation services, including 
carrier services and contracts of carriage related to shipment. The Contract Logistics 
operating segment is engaged in the provision of services related to warehouse and 
distribution activities. The Insurance Brokers operating segment is principally 
engaged in the brokerage services of insurance coverage, mainly marine liability. The 
Company's real estate portfolio comprised, as of year-end 2011, 124 logistics 
facilities. 
 
Date available between: 1994 - 2013 
 
Panalpina WeltTransport Holding AG (Panalpina) is a Switzerland-based holding 
company engaged in the provision of freight forwarding and logistics services. The 
Company's core activities comprises air freight, including such products as Priority, 
Standard, Economy and Now; ocean freight, embracing such products as FCL (Full 
Container Load), LCL (Less-than-Container Load), NCL (Non-Containerized Load), 
and logistics, offering supply chain management solutions to the Telecom, Hi-tech, 
Automotive, Retail and Fashion, as well as Healthcare and Chemical sectors. 
Panalpina provides a range of special services, such as shock sensitive cargo handling 
and temperature-controlled transportation. It operates worldwide in Asia Pacific, 
Central and South America, Europe/Africa/Middle East/Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and North America through its numerous subsidiaries. It has 
its own branches in over 80 countries and collaborates closely with partner companies 
in further 80 countries. 
 
Date available between: 2005 - 2013 
 
The Swiss Market Index (SMI) is Switzerland's main index in the country. It 
contains 20 largest and most liquid SPI large and mid-cap securities. 
 
Table 8.1 – Descriptive statistics depending on availability of data 
 
 ERKUHNE ERPANALP ERSWISSMI AVERAGE2a 
 Mean -0.011427 -0.018455 -0.019474 -0.014941 
 Median -0.021298  0.001054 -0.011138 -0.005291 
 Maximum  0.247090  0.261952  0.100149  0.202160 
 Minimum -0.182990 -0.377082 -0.173720 -0.262327 
 Std. Dev.  0.073319  0.114162  0.046619  0.083142 
 Skewness  0.303167 -0.764109 -0.630499 -0.393077 
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Figure 8.1 – Line graph of excess log-returns of Kuehne Nagel International Ltd, 
Swiss Market index, Panalpina and the average of two companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: one outlier in 2001 10 for Kuehne Nagel International Ltd, 2 outliers in 1998 
09 and 1998 11 for market index, 4 outliers in 2008 04, 2009 03, 2009 04 and 2010 04 
for Panalpina, and two in 2009 03 and 2009 04 for the average of the two companies 
	  
Table 8.2 – OLS results for Kuehne Nagel International Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERKUHNE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 15:24   
Sample (adjusted): 1994M08 2012M11  
Included observations: 220 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.600797 0.093594 6.419162 0.0000 
C 0.000655 0.004982 0.131543 0.8955 
     
     R-squared 0.158969    Mean dependent var -0.013505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155111    S.D. dependent var 0.072088 
S.E. of regression 0.066262    Akaike info criterion -2.581366 
Sum squared resid 0.957148    Schwarz criterion -2.550515 
Log likelihood 285.9502    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.568907 
F-statistic 41.20564    Durbin-Watson stat 2.149027 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table 8.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Kuehne Nagel International Ltd 
 
Dependent Variable: ERKUHNE   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 15:25   
Sample (adjusted): 1994M08 2012M11  
Included observations: 220 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 116 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.574208 0.079297 7.241233 0.0000 
C -0.002851 0.001646 -1.731839 0.0833 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000123 7.95E-05 1.547194 0.1218 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.058385 0.009524 -6.130178 0.0000 
GARCH(-1) 1.035068 0.019263 53.73273 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.157054    Mean dependent var -0.013505 
Adjusted R-squared 0.153187    S.D. dependent var 0.072088 
S.E. of regression 0.066337    Akaike info criterion -2.653009 
Sum squared resid 0.959327    Schwarz criterion -2.575881 
Log likelihood 296.8310    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.621863 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.142788    
     
      	  
Table 8.4 – OLS results for Panalpina 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ERPANALP   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/04/13   Time: 15:22   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2012M10  
Included observations: 84 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.780208 0.229648 3.397402 0.0011 
C -0.001461 0.010684 -0.136751 0.8916 
     
     R-squared 0.123392    Mean dependent var -0.016466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112701    S.D. dependent var 0.094656 
S.E. of regression 0.089163    Akaike info criterion -1.973185 
Sum squared resid 0.651900    Schwarz criterion -1.915308 
Log likelihood 84.87377    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.949919 
F-statistic 11.54234    Durbin-Watson stat 1.962569 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001052    
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Table 8.5 – GARCH (1,1) results for Panalpina 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ERPANALP   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/04/13   Time: 15:20   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2012M10  
Included observations: 84 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 35 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.746168 0.250580 2.977758 0.0029 
C 0.002111 0.000200 10.53799 0.0000 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000173 0.000996 0.173539 0.8622 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.119841 0.061056 -1.962810 0.0497 
GARCH(-1) 1.090081 0.144768 7.529872 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.121138    Mean dependent var -0.016466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110421    S.D. dependent var 0.094656 
S.E. of regression 0.089277    Akaike info criterion -2.015374 
Sum squared resid 0.653575    Schwarz criterion -1.870682 
Log likelihood 89.64570    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.957209 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.946038    
     
      	  
Table 8.6 – OLS results for the average of 2 companies 
 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE2a   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 05/04/13   Time: 15:38   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2012M12  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.676769 0.182835 3.701524 0.0004 
C -0.001682 0.008417 -0.199881 0.8421 
     
     R-squared 0.140236    Mean dependent var -0.014589 
Adjusted R-squared 0.130001    S.D. dependent var 0.076162 
S.E. of regression 0.071039    Akaike info criterion -2.428195 
Sum squared resid 0.423909    Schwarz criterion -2.371117 
Log likelihood 106.4124    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.405223 
F-statistic 13.70128    Durbin-Watson stat 2.064597 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000382    
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Table 8.7 – GARCH (1,1) results for the average of 2 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE2a   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 05/04/13   Time: 15:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2005M11 2012M12  
Included observations: 86 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERSWISSMI 0.712743 0.182830 3.898395 0.0001 
C -0.000825 0.008990 -0.091772 0.9269 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.004058 0.011664 0.347919 0.7279 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.054376 0.114694 -0.474092 0.6354 
GARCH(-1) 0.233191 2.288320 0.101905 0.9188 
     
     R-squared 0.139835    Mean dependent var -0.014589 
Adjusted R-squared 0.129595    S.D. dependent var 0.076162 
S.E. of regression 0.071056    Akaike info criterion -2.360047 
Sum squared resid 0.424107    Schwarz criterion -2.217353 
Log likelihood 106.4820    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.302619 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.077275    
     
      
Figure 8.2 – Time-varying β for Kuehne Nagel International Ltd, Panalpina and 
the average of 2 companies 
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Country 4 – Denmark 
 
DSV A/S is a Denmark-based company engaged in the provision of transport and 
logistics services. The Company's operations are divided into three business areas. 
The DSV Air and Sea business area specializes in the handling of air and sea freight 
to destinations around the world. The DSV Road business area offers transportation of 
full, part and group loads by road inside Europe. The DSV Solutions business area 
specializes in logistics solutions across the entire supply chain, from design through 
freight management, customs clearance, warehousing and distribution to information 
management and e-business support. As of December 31, 2012, the Company was 
active in more than 70 countries in Europe, the Americas, Asia, Africa and Australia. 
 
FTSE Denmark 20 index is used. It includes largest 20 Danish listed companies. 
 
Data available between: 1988 – 2013 
 
Table 9.1 – Descriptive statistics 1988 - 2013 
 
 ERDSV ERWINDMKL 
 Mean -0.040124 -0.048847 
 Median -0.043460 -0.044816 
 Maximum  0.429899  0.092917 
 Minimum -0.368054 -0.230282 
 Std. Dev.  0.097900  0.059214 
 Skewness  0.058317 -0.439596 
 
Figure 9.1 – Excess log-returns for DSV and market index 
 
 
 
 
 
Outliers: 1 outlier in 2009 05 for DSV and no outliers for the market index 
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Table 9.2 – OLS results for DSV	  
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSV   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 14:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1988M06 2013M03  
Included observations: 298 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWINDMKL 0.829698 0.079750 10.40380 0.0000 
C -0.000778 0.006111 -0.127343 0.8988 
     
     R-squared 0.267760    Mean dependent var -0.041701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.265286    S.D. dependent var 0.094182 
S.E. of regression 0.080729    Akaike info criterion -2.188754 
Sum squared resid 1.929073    Schwarz criterion -2.163941 
Log likelihood 328.1243    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.178822 
F-statistic 108.2390    Durbin-Watson stat 1.921195 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Table 9.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for DSV 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSV   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 14:28   
Sample (adjusted): 1988M06 2013M03  
Included observations: 298 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 12 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWINDMKL 0.848160 0.074244 11.42401 0.0000 
C 0.002179 0.006081 0.358342 0.7201 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.002120 0.001438 1.474341 0.1404 
RESID(-1)^2 0.135249 0.052665 2.568115 0.0102 
GARCH(-1) 0.532460 0.249479 2.134292 0.0328 
     
     R-squared 0.267153    Mean dependent var -0.041701 
Adjusted R-squared 0.264678    S.D. dependent var 0.094182 
S.E. of regression 0.080762    Akaike info criterion -2.218737 
Sum squared resid 1.930671    Schwarz criterion -2.156705 
Log likelihood 335.5918    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.193906 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.923085    
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Figure 9.2 – Time-varying β of DSV 	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Country 5 – Australia 
 
Toll Holdings Limited is an Australia-based company. It operates in six segments: 
Toll Global Resources, which is engaged in logistics services to the mining and 
resource sector together with project based activities; Toll Global Logistics, which 
includes integrated logistics services and supply chain management to national and 
multi-national customers; Toll Global Forwarding, which is engaged in the provision 
of global freight forwarding services by air, sea and land; Toll Global Express, which 
is engaged in the provision of express and overnight parcel services with a focus on 
the Asia-Pacific region; Toll Domestic Forwarding, which includes Intermodal freight 
forwarding services within Australia and New Zealand by road, rail and sea, and Toll 
Specialised and Domestic Freight, which provides specialized full container load 
(FCL) and less than a container load (LCL) forwarding services. In July 2012, it sold 
of its Australian finished vehicle distribution service to PrixCar. 
 
All Ordinaries index ("All Ords", AOI) is used and it has over 95% of all listed 
stocks included in Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). 
 
Data available between: 1993 – 2013 
 
Table 10.1 – Descriptive statistics 1993 - 2013 
 
 ERTOLX ERASX 
 Mean -0.047748 -0.056482 
 Median -0.043410 -0.050906 
 Maximum  0.245924  0.051047 
 Minimum -0.378132 -0.192404 
 Std. Dev.  0.100131  0.043684 
 Skewness -0.285423 -0.557571 
 
Figure 10.1 – Line graph of excess log-returns of Toll and market index 
 
 
   
 
Outliers: none 
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Table 10.2 – OLS results for Toll 
 
Dependent Variable: ERTOLX   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 14:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1993M12 2013M03  
Included observations: 232 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERASX 1.131871 0.131428 8.612116 0.0000 
C 0.016182 0.009377 1.725709 0.0857 
     
     R-squared 0.243840    Mean dependent var -0.047748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.240553    S.D. dependent var 0.100131 
S.E. of regression 0.087261    Akaike info criterion -2.031246 
Sum squared resid 1.751326    Schwarz criterion -2.001533 
Log likelihood 237.6245    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.019263 
F-statistic 74.16854    Durbin-Watson stat 1.861683 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
 
Table 10.3 – GARCH (1,1) results for Toll 
 
Dependent Variable: ERTOLX   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/23/13   Time: 14:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1993M12 2013M03  
Included observations: 232 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(3) + C(4)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(5)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERASX 1.148645 0.133586 8.598551 0.0000 
C 0.016589 0.009796 1.693437 0.0904 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.006597 0.009182 0.718482 0.4725 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.029296 0.049280 -0.594488 0.5522 
GARCH(-1) 0.153497 1.223441 0.125463 0.9002 
     
     R-squared 0.243757    Mean dependent var -0.047748 
Adjusted R-squared 0.240469    S.D. dependent var 0.100131 
S.E. of regression 0.087266    Akaike info criterion -2.007364 
Sum squared resid 1.751517    Schwarz criterion -1.933081 
Log likelihood 237.8542    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.977406 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.862187    
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Figure 10.2 – Time-varying β of Toll 
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ANNEX – III 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
Liner shipping 
 
Country - Denmark 
 
Table 11.1 – OLS results for Maersk 
Dependent Variable: ERDSB   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:02   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M06 2013M02  
Included observations: 273 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWIND 1.177203 0.068230 17.25350 0.0000 
SMB 0.002910 0.001766 1.648062 0.1005 
HML 0.001297 0.001597 0.812269 0.4174 
C 0.007264 0.005055 1.437130 0.1518 
     
     R-squared 0.570773    Mean dependent var -0.047829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.565986    S.D. dependent var 0.096368 
S.E. of regression 0.063487    Akaike info criterion -2.661412 
Sum squared resid 1.084240    Schwarz criterion -2.608526 
Log likelihood 367.2827    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.640182 
F-statistic 119.2361    Durbin-Watson stat 2.244654 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 11.2 - GARCH (1,1) for Maersk 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSB   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:02   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M06 2013M02  
Included observations: 273 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 18 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWIND 1.165887 0.059812 19.49266 0.0000 
SMB 0.000728 0.001434 0.507316 0.6119 
HML 0.000823 0.001556 0.528873 0.5969 
C 0.008459 0.004361 1.939688 0.0524 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000163 9.41E-05 1.728454 0.0839 
RESID(-1)^2 0.158636 0.058465 2.713337 0.0067 
GARCH(-1) 0.809506 0.062038 13.04865 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.567390    Mean dependent var -0.047829 
Adjusted R-squared 0.562566    S.D. dependent var 0.096368 
S.E. of regression 0.063737    Akaike info criterion -2.811984 
Sum squared resid 1.092785    Schwarz criterion -2.719434 
Log likelihood 390.8358    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.774832 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.237370    
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     Figure 11.1 – Time-varying β of Maersk 
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Country – Hong Kong 
 
 
Table 12.1 – OLS results for Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
 
Dependent Variable: EROROC   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M11 2012M12  
Included observations: 194 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 0.648471 0.132598 4.890497 0.0000 
SMB 0.003303 0.003236 1.020685 0.3087 
HML -0.004054 0.002799 -1.448719 0.1491 
C -0.000984 0.011360 -0.086637 0.9311 
     
     R-squared 0.141914    Mean dependent var -0.031211 
Adjusted R-squared 0.128366    S.D. dependent var 0.145562 
S.E. of regression 0.135899    Akaike info criterion -1.133406 
Sum squared resid 3.509023    Schwarz criterion -1.066028 
Log likelihood 113.9404    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.106123 
F-statistic 10.47437    Durbin-Watson stat 1.980719 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000002    
     
      
Table 12.2 – GARCH (1,1) results for Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
 
Dependent Variable: EROROC   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/27/13   Time: 00:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1996M11 2012M12  
Included observations: 194 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 52 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERHNKG 0.665574 0.118265 5.627802 0.0000 
SMB 0.004544 0.002599 1.748515 0.0804 
HML -0.004156 0.002394 -1.736380 0.0825 
C 0.004134 0.010567 0.391228 0.6956 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.024761 0.008940 2.769618 0.0056 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.104403 0.028081 -3.717867 0.0002 
GARCH(-1) -0.262309 0.473337 -0.554170 0.5795 
     
     R-squared 0.140181    Mean dependent var -0.031211 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126605    S.D. dependent var 0.145562 
S.E. of regression 0.136036    Akaike info criterion -1.136472 
Sum squared resid 3.516112    Schwarz criterion -1.018559 
Log likelihood 117.2377    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.088726 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.008062    
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Figure 12.1 - Time-varying β of Orient Overseas (International) Limited 
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Consolidators 
 
Country – US 
 
Table 13.1 – OLS results for Expeditors International of Washington 
 
Dependent Variable: EREXPD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1984M11 2013M01  
Included observations: 339 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.675011 0.068959 9.788653 0.0000 
SMB 0.001084 0.001540 0.703877 0.4820 
HML 0.001882 0.001575 1.195208 0.2329 
C -0.009302 0.005858 -1.587938 0.1132 
     
     R-squared 0.242322    Mean dependent var -0.044840 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235537    S.D. dependent var 0.094627 
S.E. of regression 0.082736    Akaike info criterion -2.134591 
Sum squared resid 2.293165    Schwarz criterion -2.089447 
Log likelihood 365.8132    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.116601 
F-statistic 35.71347    Durbin-Watson stat 2.215682 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 13.2 – GARCH (1,1) results for Expeditors International of Washington 
 
Dependent Variable: EREXPD   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 22:50   
Sample (adjusted): 1984M11 2013M01  
Included observations: 339 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 24 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.661158 0.055294 11.95715 0.0000 
SMB 0.001174 0.001284 0.913883 0.3608 
HML 0.001931 0.001509 1.279706 0.2006 
C -0.009792 0.005752 -1.702479 0.0887 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.001085 0.001861 0.583227 0.5597 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.003557 0.019973 -0.178112 0.8586 
GARCH(-1) 0.840622 0.277730 3.026759 0.0025 
     
     R-squared 0.242223    Mean dependent var -0.044840 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235437    S.D. dependent var 0.094627 
S.E. of regression 0.082742    Akaike info criterion -2.119986 
Sum squared resid 2.293465    Schwarz criterion -2.040983 
Log likelihood 366.3376    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.088503 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.216382    
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Table 13.3 – OLS results for C.H. Robinson 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCHRW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M12 2013M01  
Included observations: 182 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.416563 0.081578 5.106340 0.0000 
SMB -0.001181 0.001876 -0.629404 0.5299 
HML -0.001647 0.001939 -0.848973 0.3970 
C -0.016369 0.007416 -2.207401 0.0286 
     
     R-squared 0.129185    Mean dependent var -0.035487 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114509    S.D. dependent var 0.091510 
S.E. of regression 0.086112    Akaike info criterion -2.044607 
Sum squared resid 1.319914    Schwarz criterion -1.974189 
Log likelihood 190.0592    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.016060 
F-statistic 8.802104    Durbin-Watson stat 2.537396 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000018    
     
      
Table 13.4 – GARCH (1,1) results for C.H. Robinson 
 
Dependent Variable: ERCHRW   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1997M12 2013M01  
Included observations: 182 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.431024 0.081373 5.296894 0.0000 
SMB 0.001445 0.001354 1.067175 0.2859 
HML -0.000973 0.001677 -0.580121 0.5618 
C -0.020394 0.006205 -3.286922 0.0010 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000945 0.000695 1.359915 0.1739 
RESID(-1)^2 0.195292 0.076544 2.551374 0.0107 
GARCH(-1) 0.677485 0.135929 4.984099 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.116379    Mean dependent var -0.035487 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101486    S.D. dependent var 0.091510 
S.E. of regression 0.086743    Akaike info criterion -2.127092 
Sum squared resid 1.339326    Schwarz criterion -2.003861 
Log likelihood 200.5653    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.077135 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.532445    
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Table 13.5 – OLS results for UPS 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUPS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:08   
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 157 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.257495 0.051864 4.964774 0.0000 
SMB 0.002385 0.001204 1.979878 0.0495 
HML 0.000775 0.001304 0.594119 0.5533 
C -0.033058 0.004887 -6.764616 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.168581    Mean dependent var -0.044753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152278    S.D. dependent var 0.055095 
S.E. of regression 0.050727    Akaike info criterion -3.099583 
Sum squared resid 0.393699    Schwarz criterion -3.021717 
Log likelihood 247.3173    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.067959 
F-statistic 10.34089    Durbin-Watson stat 2.209500 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000003    
     
      
 
Table 13.6 – GARCH (1,1) results for UPS 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUPS   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:08   
Sample (adjusted): 2000M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 157 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 25 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.371724 0.041701 8.913939 0.0000 
SMB 0.000466 0.001340 0.347447 0.7283 
HML 0.000919 0.001251 0.734453 0.4627 
C -0.026189 0.004682 -5.593321 0.0000 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000297 0.000116 2.557193 0.0106 
RESID(-1)^2 -0.041059 0.018288 -2.245143 0.0248 
GARCH(-1) 0.887489 0.055205 16.07633 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.127427    Mean dependent var -0.044753 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110318    S.D. dependent var 0.055095 
S.E. of regression 0.051967    Akaike info criterion -3.201322 
Sum squared resid 0.413186    Schwarz criterion -3.065057 
Log likelihood 258.3038    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.145980 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.135071    
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Table 13.7 – OLS results for UTi Worldwide Inc 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUTIW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:14   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.597857 0.116599 5.127461 0.0000 
SMB 0.002146 0.003077 0.697193 0.4868 
HML -0.003902 0.003049 -1.279927 0.2027 
C -0.012937 0.009869 -1.310895 0.1920 
     
     R-squared 0.162986    Mean dependent var -0.039520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.145177    S.D. dependent var 0.103734 
S.E. of regression 0.095909    Akaike info criterion -1.823644 
Sum squared resid 1.296982    Schwarz criterion -1.741527 
Log likelihood 136.2142    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.790277 
F-statistic 9.151967    Durbin-Watson stat 2.300839 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000014    
     
      
 
Table 13.8 – GARCH (1,1) results for UTi Worldwide Inc 
 
Dependent Variable: ERUTIW   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:14   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 20 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.904223 0.134336 6.731046 0.0000 
SMB 0.000139 0.003404 0.040975 0.9673 
HML -5.45E-05 0.002696 -0.020215 0.9839 
C -0.003574 0.009673 -0.369439 0.7118 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000399 0.000259 1.537524 0.1242 
RESID(-1)^2 0.049335 0.054202 0.910213 0.3627 
GARCH(-1) 0.884698 0.069901 12.65639 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.097456    Mean dependent var -0.039520 
Adjusted R-squared 0.078253    S.D. dependent var 0.103734 
S.E. of regression 0.099592    Akaike info criterion -1.876181 
Sum squared resid 1.398523    Schwarz criterion -1.732477 
Log likelihood 143.0231    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.817789 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.431280    
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Table 13.9 – OLS results for the average of 4 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE4   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:25   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.539205 0.059512 9.060433 0.0000 
SMB -0.000503 0.001616 -0.311186 0.7561 
HML -0.002934 0.001544 -1.899966 0.0595 
C -0.011054 0.005111 -2.162920 0.0322 
     
     R-squared 0.368626    Mean dependent var -0.035558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.355192    S.D. dependent var 0.063279 
S.E. of regression 0.050813    Akaike info criterion -3.094126 
Sum squared resid 0.364058    Schwarz criterion -3.012009 
Log likelihood 228.3242    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.060759 
F-statistic 27.44078    Durbin-Watson stat 2.250173 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 13.10 – GARCH (1,1) results for the average of 4 companies 
 
Dependent Variable: AVERAGE4   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:26   
Sample (adjusted): 2001M01 2013M01  
Included observations: 145 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 46 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERNASDA 0.664092 0.067521 9.835336 0.0000 
SMB -0.001591 0.001657 -0.960171 0.3370 
HML -0.002170 0.001486 -1.460612 0.1441 
C -0.006860 0.005023 -1.365852 0.1720 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.000184 0.000101 1.826438 0.0678 
RESID(-1)^2 0.004616 0.039757 0.116113 0.9076 
GARCH(-1) 0.904018 0.061290 14.74985 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.343678    Mean dependent var -0.035558 
Adjusted R-squared 0.329713    S.D. dependent var 0.063279 
S.E. of regression 0.051807    Akaike info criterion -3.106092 
Sum squared resid 0.378443    Schwarz criterion -2.962388 
Log likelihood 232.1917    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.047701 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.276677    
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Figure 13.1 – Time-varying β of Expeditors International of Washington, C.H. 
Robinson, UPS, UTi Worldwide Inc and the average of 4 companies 
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Country – Denmark 
 
Table 14.1 – OLS results for DSV 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSV   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M07 2013M02  
Included observations: 272 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWINDMKL 0.868471 0.086955 9.987553 0.0000 
SMB 0.001407 0.002228 0.631674 0.5281 
HML 0.001936 0.002016 0.960147 0.3378 
C 0.001702 0.006442 0.264139 0.7919 
     
     R-squared 0.306571    Mean dependent var -0.038954 
Adjusted R-squared 0.298808    S.D. dependent var 0.095634 
S.E. of regression 0.080081    Akaike info criterion -2.196952 
Sum squared resid 1.718688    Schwarz criterion -2.143926 
Log likelihood 302.7855    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.175664 
F-statistic 39.49497    Durbin-Watson stat 1.936275 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
Table 14.2 – GARCH (1,1) results for DSV 
 
Dependent Variable: ERDSV   
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution 
Date: 04/26/13   Time: 23:49   
Sample (adjusted): 1990M07 2013M02  
Included observations: 272 after adjustments  
Convergence achieved after 17 iterations  
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7) 
GARCH = C(5) + C(6)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(7)*GARCH(-1) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.   
     
     ERWINDMKL 0.878469 0.077843 11.28515 0.0000 
SMB 0.001462 0.002009 0.727697 0.4668 
HML 0.002436 0.001604 1.517975 0.1290 
C 0.004511 0.006272 0.719292 0.4720 
     
      Variance Equation   
     
     C 0.001672 0.001152 1.451462 0.1467 
RESID(-1)^2 0.150987 0.059067 2.556189 0.0106 
GARCH(-1) 0.583064 0.211831 2.752492 0.0059 
     
     R-squared 0.305656    Mean dependent var -0.038954 
Adjusted R-squared 0.297883    S.D. dependent var 0.095634 
S.E. of regression 0.080134    Akaike info criterion -2.232622 
Sum squared resid 1.720956    Schwarz criterion -2.139826 
Log likelihood 310.6366    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.195367 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.937958    
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Figure 14.1 – Time-varying β of DSV 
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